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ABSTRACT

Six papers on Caribbean immigrants and refugees in south Florida are presented in this document. Their titles (and authors) are: (1) "Let's Welcome the Refugees" (Bryan O. Walsh); (2) "The Haitians and America's 'Pull'" (Anthony P. Maingot); (3) "Estimates of Haitian International Migration for the 1950-1980 Period" (James Allman); (4) "West Indian Migration: Historical Notes and Contemporary Trends" (Dawn I. Marshall); (5) "The 'Freedom Flotilla' Cuban Emigrants" (Robert L. Bach); and (6) "International Migration and Refugees: The Caribbean, South Florida and the Northeast" (Maingot). The first two papers, representing different perspectives on the immigration issue, originally appeared in the "Miami Herald" and elicited wide community response. The next three papers were presented at a 1980 conference on international migration and refugees. The sixth paper (by Anthony P. Maingot) reports on private sessions held with the United States Coordinator of Refugee Affairs. (KH)

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"Immigrants and Refugees: The Caribbean and South Florida"

Dialogue Series #2

March, 1981

Occasional Papers Series
DIALOGUES



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"Immigrants and Refugees:
The Caribbean and South Florida"

Dialogue Series #2

March, 1981

Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199

"IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: THE CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH FLORIDA"

PREFACE

Refugees and immigrants from the Caribbean are now arriving in South Florida at an unprecedented rate. While both are quite common to the United States, they have caused considerable debate in Florida because of their impact on all aspects of daily life.

At this point in the discussion, systematically collected information and analysis is needed, both from members of the community and academia. This publication brings together a number of studies which may help to inform the public discussion.

The first two papers represent differing perspectives of the immigration issue as viewed by Msgr. Bryan O. Walsh of the Catholic Archiocese of Miami and Dr. Anthony Maingot, Chairperson of the FIU's Sociology/Anthropology Department. Both views were carried in the Miami Herald and elicited wide community response. In the late summer 1980 a "Conference on International Migration and Refugees: The Caribbean and South Florida" was held at FIU under the sponsorship of the Student Government Association (FIU), the Department of Sociology/Anthropology (FIU), LACC, the First National Bank of Greater Miami, Hialeah, and the Ford Foundation. Three papers are reproduced here: James Allman's "Estimates of Haitian International Migration for the 1950-1980 Period," Dawn Marshall's "West Indian Migration: Historical and Contemporary Trends," and Robert L. Bach's "The 'Freedom Flotilla' Cuban Emigrants." Following the Miami Conference, a private session with the U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs Ambassador Victor Palmieri examined key issues on immigration and refugee affairs. This was followed by a similar meeting in New York City. A report by Prof. Maingot on these meetings concludes this working papers series.

Mark B. Rosenberg
Director
Latin American and Caribbean Center

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LET'S WELCOME THE REFUGEES

BY

Msgr. Bryan O. Walsh
Director
Catholic Charities of the Archdioces of Miami

(Reprinted from THE MIAMI HERALD, Viewpoint Section, Sunday, 4/13/80)

LET's WELCOME THE REFUGEES

by

Bryan O. Walsh

Two events in Miami last Monday helped focus attention on this city's role as the refugee capital of the United States.

The first was a series of demonstrations by 15,000 Cuban exiles on behalf of their 10,000 fellow countrymen who had sought political asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.

The second was the start of the U.S. District Court trial of a class-action suit against the U.S. Attorney General on behalf of some 5,000 Haitians seeking refugee status.

Both events have attracted wide coverage in the media and helped surface some anti-refugee feelings and so-called Anglo backlash.

This past week emotions have run high. The unprecedented invasion of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana has become one of the historic highlights of the Cuban Revolution. It seemed to have released the springs of patriotism which had been at a low ebb in the Cuban exile community. Those who took the time to read the dramatic and heart-rending testimony given by Haitians in Judge James Lawrence King's court could not help but be deeply moved. Few Miamians, native or exile, could avoid the frustration and irritation of traffic jams caused by a combination of enthusiastic demonstrators and tropical downpours.

At times such as this, long-dormant feelings and anxieties tend to surface and even be exaggerated. Newspaper surveys, despite stated disclaimers of lack of scientific validity, are taken seriously and help to fan the flames of prejudice and racism. It is vitally important for all concerned, both observers and participants, individuals and groups to pause and try to gain a more objective perspective on what is happening.

It is necessary to place the events of this past week in the historical perspective of the U.S. tradition of offering refugee status to those who suffer persecution for religious and/or political reasons. They also must be seen in the light of the total U.S. experience as a nation of immigrants--an experience which is not unique to this nation. Because these issues have moral and ethical qualities, no perspective can be complete without taking into account the imperative of this nation's Judaic-Christian tradition and its teachings on the care of the refugee, and the stranger.

In the case of Miami's experience with refugees, it is important to note the similarities and differences between the various groups. By reason of numbers, the Cubans, followed by the Haitians, occupy center stage. But others, such as the Soviet Jews, the Indochinese, the Nicaraguans, cannot be ignored. The issue of the so-called "Anglo" backlash is part of the picture and cannot be summarily dismissed or ignored in the hope that it will go away.

The utmost task is the development of a realistic U.S. policy on refugees that will enable this great nation to fulfill its international commitments, be faithful to its historical traditions and values, and ease the natural and expected stresses and strains of a living society.

THE U.S. AND REFUGEES

"The happy and powerful do not go into exile." Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1835, at Ellis Island, the reception center in New York Harbor where 20 million seekers of freedom and opportunity were processed between 1855 and 1934, one observer described the newcomers as "common people, who made an uncommon decision." One would be hard put to find more apt words to describe the Cubans and Haitians who seek freedom and opportunity in South Florida today. Certainly, the Cubans who have sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy and the Haitians who risk 700 miles of sea in leaking sailboats have made an "uncommon decision."

Few Americans, and few Miamians, seem to be aware of the full extent of immigration in the United States today. Official Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) figures for 1979 have not been published. But unofficial sources place the number of persons lawfully admitted to the United States for residence and work last year at approximately, 600,000. Who were these 600,000? In round figures, the breakdown is as follows: 373,000 were regular immigrants who came here seeking work with the usual affidavits of support; 227,000 were refugees, of whom 190,000 were Indochinese, 20,000 Russian Jews, 11,000 Cubans, 3,000 Eastern Europeans, 1,500 Africans (mostly from Ethiopia), 1,000 from the Middle East, and 400 from elsewhere in Latin America. About 10,000 are estimated to have settled in South Florida.

Under the 1980 Refugee Act, INS officials and Department of State officials will meet with congressional committees in a few weeks to decide the breakdown for the current year. In effect what happens under the new legislation is that the total number of refugees admitted to the United States - expected to total about the same as last year - is not affected by such events as what occurred at the Peruvian Embassy last week. What is affected is the distribution of the number of slots available. That is a policy decision involving the executive branch and the Congress.

Any decisions, therefore, on the admission of increased numbers of Haitians or Cubans results in a lowering of priority for refugees from other parts of the world. However, under exceptional circumstances, the law does allow the president, in consultation with congressional committees, some flexibility in the total numbers. It is therefore very important for Miamians to keep this is perspective when they hear stories of new waves of Haitians or Cubans. It would seem that if this country is reaching the saturation point, as some allege, then there are ample opportunities to cut back on the numbers before excluding refugees. Even in the case of refugees surely those who reach the shores under their own efforts, such as the South Florida boat people, have a special priority.

THE CUBAN CASE

The plight of the Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy has made headlines around the world. It has become a "media event." But the frustration that led to that "uncommon decision" is not new. It arose out of the simple fact that some people have been prevented for 20 years from leaving Cuba because they did not fall into the right slot at the right time - characteristic of this country's and, indeed, every country's response to the cries of the refugee. Parents have been separated from children, husbands from wives, brothers from sisters and, despite the various attempts at family reunion, for some the door to freedom has remained shut. That is why the official Cuban Government's Communist newspaper Gramma could editorialize, "There is no absence of heart here. But will you find it out there?"

Cuban refugees have been coming to Miami since 1959. However, for only nine of those 21 years has the number been significant. These were the years 1961-62 and 1966-73, when roughly a thousand a week arrived in Miami on direct flights. The intervening years have been years of waiting and frustration involving untold disappointments as these people struggled to get accepted in a third country, even with a transit visa. During the past 18 months, some 8,000 - including political prisoners and their dependents - have come. The U.S. Government some weeks ago renewed its commitment to grant visas to some 20,000 ex-political prisoners and their dependents, namely those who were released before August 1978. At the current rate of some 150 persons per week, it will take more than three years for that group to be admitted to the United States. Standing in line behind them are countless numbers who are asking for admission to be reunited with their families here on humanitarian grounds. Even with the addition of what a Carter Administration spokeman called a "fair share" of the Peruvian Embassy group, the actual impact of these numbers on Miami is very small in comparison with normal immigration into this area, whether from other parts of the United States or abroad.

This does not mean that Miami can absorb additional refugees without difficulty. The federal government must move to realistically implement aid for this community. It is manifestly unfair for the federal government to leave the burden of cost on the local community when the impact is the result of national policy. In the case of the Cubans, this aid has been made available, though in increasingly lesser amounts during the past few years.

The most serious omission has been in the area of housing. Not one single unit of public housing has been allocated to Dade County because of the unprecedented refugee impact in the past 20 years. The federal government therefore, must bear the blame for the high cost and scarcity of rental housing afflicting this community. Should the federal government do anything to speed up the flow of refugees into this community, it must take cognizance of the housing problem and provide relief by assisting in the development of housing for low-and moderate-income families.

At the same time it should provide for incentives for refugees to resettle in other parts of the United States. In this regard it should be noted that many communities around the country are only too anxious to welcome refugees. At the present time, the U.S. Catholic Conference Migration and Refugee Service is resettling Indochinese at the rate of 9,000 persons per month and would have little difficulty in resettling more Cubans.

THE HAITIAN CASE

The flight of the Haitian boat people has aroused widespread sympathy among the people of South Florida. Few, indeed, have objected to their presence and there have been widespread indications of support for a reversal of the U.S. government's policy of refusing them political asylum. While numbers have increased somewhat in recent weeks, in absolute terms they have been very insignificant,some 10,000 or 12,000 over the past eight years. The U.S. government has refused all but 50 to 60 of their applications, characterizing them as economic immigrants in search of a better life rather than political refugees.

While the new refugee act, which goes into effect on May 15, removes the more obvious examples of discrimination based on geography and/or political orientation, it does remove one real option the President has to help the Haitians and this community - the use of his executive authority to order the attorney general to grant asylum to those currently here. This dramatic gesture would compensate somewhat for the discrimination in the old law and the sufferings caused by the hard-line policy of the Immigration and Naturalization Service over the past eight years.

In this regard, the U.S. government bears a special responsibility to this community, a responsibility it has chosen to ignore. The Haitian problem exists in Miami because of policies at the national level. These policies involve not only the way the Haitian petitioners for asylum are handled by the government. Also involved is the fact that the refugees are here because of repression in their homeland by a government that enjoys the support and friendship of the United States. The fact of political persecution in Haiti was admitted by the U.S. government when it granted political asylum to a favored few.

However, for whatever reasons that lie behind these policy positions, the fact remains that this community has the burden of the Haitians, whose humanitarian needs no one can deny, because of national policy. The Carter Administration owes it to this community to grant relief. The most immediate and effective answer is the granting of political asylum before May 15. The issue of polarization among Black, Hispanic and Anglo communities will be seriously affected by the President's failure to act. This is a case where not to make a decision is to decide.

'ANGLO' BLACKLASH

Each new wave of Cuban exiles is an opportunity for the somewhat dormant, and half-forgotten feelings of resentment against the newcomer to surface. This is not caused by media polls which carry with them the intrinsic bias that those who feel most strongly against a certain issue are most likely to respond. These feelings and anxieties are real and must be dealt with if the fiber of the community is to remain strong and healthy.

Resentment against those who are different in culture and language is not unique to Miami or to the United States. It is a weakness that is shared by all humanity and in all of history has been the root of much strife and suffering. There would seem to be no easy answer. When the newcomer is poor, weak, dependent, he is resented as a burden. When he is successful, powerful and rich, he is a threat.

No wonder that the Judai-Christian religion heritage sees this as a sin and in the Bible, constantly reminds the community of believers of their special responsibility towards the refugee, ranking them along side the widow and the orphan as being especially worthy of our charity. The Judai-Christian tradition of seeing all men and women as the children of the same common Father provides the basis by which a community may, with hard work and goodwill, overcome these difficulties. A key to the solution lies in better lines of communication, more coherent government policies, and good factual information. Once the events of this past week are placed in proper perspective, then the threat can be eased and the anxieties can be relaxed.

These difficulties are nothing new in U.S. Society.

Edward Wakin, in *Enter the Irish American*, writes:

"For their part, native Americans already had been sounding alarms about foreigners since the late 18th Century. The Federalists warned of French revolutionary spies and 'hordes of wild Irishmen.' Nativism emerged early in the 19th Century with the Irish as the particular target of fear and resentment. To the nativist, alien custom, habits, attitudes and appearances threatened the American way of life. The large influx of the Irish inevitably increased the resentment against them."

Wakin goes on to describe the effects of these attitudes on the newcomer:

"A self-perpetuating process was at work among the Irish, as with later immigrants. In sticking together, they provided a clear target for hostility. Hostility, in turn, reinforced the tendency to stick together, for it presented the Irish with an obvious choice: on the one hand, acceptance amidst the protection and pleasures of their own kind; or, on the other hand, rejection or at least indifference among the others."

These stresses and stains are being experienced by every society today. The increased mobility of people, the growth of the worldwide refugee problem the growing disparity between developed and developing countries contribute to the problem. Last week's riot in Bristol, England, similar occurrences among Algerian and portugese imigrants in France, the plight of the children of the foreign worker in West Germany and Sweden, show that no society is immune.

When compared to other parts of the world, and indeed the United States, Miami has a remarkably good record. Yet much remains to be done and the work of the Community Relations Board and other intergroup relations must be intensified if all segments of this community are to reach their full potential. In this regard, it is important for the Hispanic community to realize that this is a two-way or rather a three-way street that requires give and take on both sides. The Hispanic community's stake in good community relations is very good. Much more active participation by the power-brokers is essential to future progress.

TOWARD A U.S. POLICY ON REFUGEES

The U.S. national policy on refugees is not clear. The new 1980 Refugee Act is an improvement and shows that the nation and Congress is moving toward a national policy. The more flagrant discriminations in the 1952 Immigration Act have been removed. That legislation basically recognized as refugees only those who fled from a Communist government or were from the Middle East. The new act finally accepts the 1948 United Nations definition of a "refugee" as one who "has a well-founded fear of persecution."

However, a real policy issue remains--the recognition of how to deal with a "refugee" in the strict meaning of the United Nations Protocol and Convention, of which the United States is a signatory and which the U.S. Senate has accepted as a treaty. This is the question of how to handle a human being who is in the

United States one way or another of who seeks admission to the United States as the country of first asylum under the terms of the United Nations Protocol. Very few of the 1.8 million people admitted to the United States as refugees since the end of World War II are in this category. All but about 25,000 at the most were in other countries when they were carefully selected for admission to the United States as documented aliens long before they arrived here. The majority of the exception are the South Florida boat people, Cuban and Haitian.

It would seem that among the 600,000 legally admitted by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, a high priority should be given to persons who most closely meet the definition of refugee--namely, one who seeks refugee status here, as the country of first asylum, because he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to his homeland. This is the only category of refugees in which the United States finds itself with the burden of sending them back, thus dramatically increasing the prospects of persecution.

The development of a clear U.S. policy on this issue with reasonable guidelines for proof of legitimate claims will go a long way toward solving the problems Dade County has with refugees. Such a policy is long overdue.

THE HAITIANS AND AMERICA'S 'PULL'

BY

Anthony P. Maingot
Chairperson

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY/ANTHROPOLOGY
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

(Reprinted from THE MIAMI HERALD Section N (Sunday, April 20, 1980).)

In the late 1930's the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal began work on what would be a monumental study of American race relations. The study appeared in 1946 under the title The American Dilemma suggestive and descriptive of its central thesis: Americans generally vascillate between being hard-headed and soft-hearted. In the midst of racism there is the yearning to be just, to be liked, to be fair; nothing of the categorical South African racist mentality ever became the national temper in this country (although it of course existed — and exists — in peckets). This trend in turn is combined with two other deeply rooted traits, the desire to avoid conflict and the belief that all problems have solutions. The underpinning of this world view are the belief that conflict is invariably a result of a break-down in communications and an assumption that Morton Kaplan once called the "myth of methodology": that the right technique, method or piece of legislation can solve any problem.

So much of this complex approach to problems is evident in the discussion surrounding the Haitian "boat people". Msgr. Bryan O. Walsh's recent appeal to welcome the refugees is very much in this tradition. He appeals first to compassion and Judeo Christian charity, then to clarity of communication and finally to policy (which logically is premised on the principle of charity.)

One hesitates, of course, to rush to an attack on such sincere and sterling sentiments -- they are indeed what make America the most extraordinary, albeit perplexing, super power in modern history. Capitalism and super-power status are impersonal enough to want now to remove any heart and sentiment from the body politic. Unfortunately, it is precisely this kind of operation which is called for. This is so because a realistic view of social events tell us that there are indeed problems which are beyond solution — not throughout eternity but in any given time or space. A bit of what the Spaniard Unamuno called "the tragic sense of life" to Americans at this stage of history.

It is only in this spirit that one dares take issue with the specific proposals contained in Msgr. Walsh's call for a "clear policy" on immigration. To begin with, perfect clarity exists only on the two polar ends of a continuum, i.e. no immigrants allowed (today's Japan comes closest to this) or no restrictions of any type (early 19th Century U.S. came closest). Anything in between is going to involve a trade off between contending views, and political groups. This is especially so in a complex, democratic plural society such as the U.S. Clarity tends to increase conflict precisely because the various groups now understand better than ever how their interests have been affected and immigration policy is your classical zero-sum game: more for one group necessarily means less for the other. This is more than amply recorded in the tempestuous history of U.S. Immigration policies. In fact even the broader attitudes or "moods" of the nation have varied dramatically over its young history: from Anglo-conformity, to the Melting Pot, to cultural pluralism to the period of ethnic revitalization we are now experiencing. Each major period witnessed shifts in attitudes and policy towards immigration (both as to number and type), acculturation and assimilation. Even in as limited a time and space as Miami from 1970 to 1980 we see quite dramatic variations no so much in the letter of the law but in the application thereof. There is no doubt that political pressures resulted in the Haitian "refugees" being granted temporary work permits during 1977 and 1978 whereas formerly they were encarcerated in Texas to be deported. Again, political pressure led to limitations on the granting of work permits which began in late 1978. These pressures need not emanate from the immediate area of the problem since the implications of any policy on Haitians to the question of illegal migration in the U.S. generally and the Mexican situation specifically is obvious. But resentments and doubts at the local level are significant because the strains are most evident there.

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To cite but one example, projected health costs for Dade County Haitians (some 16,000) for 1979-80 was $2.5 million. Federal Government absorbed 44%, Dade County 39%, State of Florida 8%, other agencies 9%. Just the health costs of a group here illegally is 1/3 the total collected by United Way to serve 144 agencies in Dade County. Contrary to the case of the Cuban exiles who are absorbed into a community, the Haitian noir is totally ignored by the established mulatre community. The racial/class divisions existing in Haiti do not collapse in exile. Any policy on immigration no matter how clear is going to generate conflict since in a question such as this you cannot avoid it, avoiding conflict cannot be the central goal of policy; that goal has to be the nation's security first, and its development a close second. To the extent that there are "responsibilities" as regarding immigrants, these are by conviction and sentiment, not international law or treaty. So the Japanese who systematically refuse immigration to any are perfectly within their rights; there is nothing in international law which says a nation has to accept immigrants. It is precisely because the issue of "political refugee" falls into a different category of international convention and practice that it is absolutely essential that the two be kept quite distinct. While certainly motivated by charity and generosity, the facile argument that anyone who arrives by boat is a political refugee does no service to the quest of realistic policy, or to the desperate needs of those legitimate refugees of which our Hemisphere has its share. Why is a "boat person" any more of a political refugee than a "wetback" who walks accross the border or one who merely stays after his Visitor Visa has expired? To the Jamaican or Brazilian who has waited years and spent considerable sums attempting to acquire a visa, the whole question must seem irrational and unfair.

Realistic policy must start with an assessment of what causes people to migrate in the first place. We know that while the forces are of two types, they more often than not operate together which accounts for the compelling character of migration. "Push" factors are those which simply force an individual to leave; the political refugee is the clearest case (he either leaves or else). There are of course other push factors; viz. economic ones such as drought or flooding. Then there are "pull" factors. The person who moves to be with a loved one is a pure example, as is the movement to a "promised land", viz. the great trek West in American history.

In the Caribbean what has been operating is a powerful combination of both. Let us begin with the more obvious (though certainly no less complex psychologically) one: the "pull". The Caribbean has known numerous "promised lands": the fact that this New World attracted the old world is of course clear. The mythical El Dorado might not have been found but millions found haven and a new life.

Without lingering on the obvious "pull" factor operating on Columbus and the millions who followed his lead, one can see numerous "pull" centers in modern Caribbean history: the construction of the Panama Canal created such a great migration of West Indians to Panama that riots frequently broke out at the recruiting stations in Barbados and Jamaica. Many of those same migrants would later move up the Central American coast "pulled" by the new railroad construction being developed to handle the banana and coffee trades of those countries. Cuba in the first two decades of this century exercised a magnetic pull on many: Spaniards by the hundreds of thousands, Haitians to cut cane and Jamaicans to work in the sugar factories. The "Dance of the Millions" as that period was called soon collapsed and with it the pull effect. Push replaced it. Jamaicans, Spaniards, but especially Haitians were caught in the anti-foreigner mood of the revolutionary thirties and thousands were rudely repatriated. The small islands of the Caribbean chain have traditionally served as "stepping stones": people move from one to the other until their eventual arrival in the promised land. Trinidad served as a stepping stone for Leeward islanders on their way (accross 7 miles of the Bay of Paria) to the oil fields of Venezuela where Portuguese, Italians, and Americans had already arrived after a more comfortable trip. Those who found something on Trinidad island stayed — from there the "ghettos" of Grenadians especially in parts of Port of Spain. And accross the Andes, the Venezuelan city of Cucuta is the rendez-vous of millions of Colombian indocumentados, illegal aliens. Father Alex Delpiaz, Director of the Migration Center in Cucuta speaks much as Msgr. Walsh does in Miami: let them in and treat them humanely. In Barbados the Parliament recently debated the increasing number of "Small islanders" (St. Lucians, St. Vincentians, Dominicans) brought in to cut cane but now taking over the construction jobs, and one party claimed registering to vote. In all these cases there has been an obvious "pull" effect — the spot selected is always in the midst of a boom or at least greater development than the spot being left. And no country in the history of mankind has exercised so profound and so enduring a "pull" effect as has the United States. The view of America which existed in Europe has already been amply recorded and the proof of its impact are the millions who crossed the Atlantic to pursue its promise. In the Caribbean, "America" exercises a pull effect which is nearly religious in dimension: it is a total picture of redemption, calling forth an unquestioned faith in its purported virtues and capacity for deliverance; an absolute image inviting total sacrifice and dedication. It is not a new image. Table No. 1 shows that since the earliest years of American nationhood Antilleans have been pulled to this land. And they have been of all races, religious, social classes and occupations. The Trinidadian Summa Cum Laude graduate from the Wharton School of Business held to that image in no less a primordial fashion than the ex-policeman from the same island. From there the vibrant working class Antillean communities of the Bronx or Brooklyn and the elegant and sophisticated upper middle class Antillean communities in Queens. Each Coca Cola add an invitation to fun-filled leisure, each Pepsodent smile a promise of robust health. The image of America as the cornucopia of the world is enhaced at every turn.

Toaay the number of "pull" centers in the Caribbean are fewer. There is no Panama Canal and no one really wants to migrate to Cuba. Country after country has tightened their immigration policies as population pressures increase; the formerly liberal states of Britain, Holland, and Canada now have very restrictive policies. More and more the United States becomes the one great "pull" center for the Caribbean and indeed for the world. "Push" factors, on the other hand, have increased enormously.

The "Stepping Stone" trend escalates for example, as small farmers in Nevis face reduced acreage and productivity, they move to St. Kitts but only as a stepping stone on the way the Virgin Islands which is a step towards Puerto Rico the final step before America. And in the Virgin Islands the Leeward Islanders suffer much hardship in silence: it is the penance of the faithful on their way to the promised land.

What happens when in a particular geopolotical area one finds multiple "push" center and fewer and fewer "pull" ones? This is the core question which American and Hemispheric policy makers have to face. In the Caribbean basin alone the population now stands at 27 million for the islands, 80 million for Mexico and Central America, and 36 million for Venezuela and Colombia for a total of 144 million.

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Nothing illustrates this dramatic shift in the Caribbean in the dynamics of "push" and "pull" factors than the Haitian case. Haiti has never been welcomed into the "Western Hemisphere." That brilliant Haitian statesman Petion understood that for Haiti to be one of the group she had to give more than her share. And this he did, providing Bolivar with ships, guns, money and volunteers which saved the independence movement of Spanish America. With Petion defeated in Haiti, Bolivar's Gran Colombia government would not much later prohibit any relations (except trade!) with that "uncivilized" nation. The history of Haiti is the history of an epic and even primitive struggle for independence and self-realization. The tragedy was and is that each victory was a pyrrhic one — the losses were so enormously that they sent the nation further and further away from salvation. Haiti today, with ten times the population produces 1/10 what was produced in 1789. While surely one applauds the destruction of slavery, one has to reckon today with the economic realities since hunger and disease are themselves forms of slavery. And in Haiti they are widespread. It is not all surprising therefore that between 65 and 75% of the Haitians who have arrived in Florida since 1972 are from the North-West and the Western parts — by far the most impoverished areas of the country. Only some 10% come from the fertile South. The large coastal population centers of Gonaives and St. Marc in Artibonite are staging areas for the migrants -- not to the U.S. directly but through the stepping stones of the Bahamas. While the data is tentative it is estimated that some 60% of the Haitian household heads in Miami lived in the Bahamas before moving on to Miami. And it is not unimportant that the 35% of household heads who came directly from Haiti tend to be of higher social and economic status. As early as 1969 the Haitian sociologist B. Edouard was publishing on the significance of the Haitian migration to the Bahamas. But one does not have to be a trained sociologist to spot the Haitians in Nassay and Freeport, they are everywhere — especially around the dumps where they scavenge to exist. The stepping stone principle has led to a well-developed business network in human cargoes which operates out of Haiti, the Bahamas and Miami. The "pull" of the U.S. on Haitians is so great that the sociologist, Michael Laguerre found young men living right on the border of Dominican Republic (and whose forefathers had traditionally been drawn to the Dominican Republic) moving clear accross Haiti to the coast and from there to the Bahamas on their way to the U.S. So established is the pattern that the Haitian community adjusts to the fact of departure: a clear set of community-wide responsibilities for relatives left behind are put into motion, and these are no less strong and binding than the obligations which the migrant takes with him (2/3 are males): watch out for the folks back home, send them money regularly, bring them as soon as possible. Because it is as admirable an expression of solidarity, loyalty and sense of fair play as can be found anywhere on earth one is instinctively moved by the desire to open one's heart to every one who ventures out — the few who actually leave directly from Haitian shores or the many who get towed from Freeport to within shouting distance of the Florida coast.

But policy cannot be based as sentiments alone. In an area with such a mulciplicity of foreign demandandt and native propolents or opponents, the recourse to legality and procedure is the only fair and manageable one. And this should hold equally for Haitians, Cubans or any other nationality group.

What, then, might a realistic immigration policy conceivably look like? Painting with a broad brush, it might contain the following elements:

1. A premise that the world's and even this Hemisphere's problems cannot be solved through immigration policies alone and certainly not an isolated American immigration policy no matter how wise and clear. It is a world-wide problem and certain elements of that problem are beyond solution at this time and that one will have to live with the conflicts which naturally surround any issue as complex as this.

2. The principle of legality and procedure has to be imposed. As is said of law: not only should it be done, it shoule be seen to have been done. It is not a question of stopping Haitian immigration (since 1968 a total of 72,000 alien resident visas went to Haitians) but of rationalization through regulation. Such a delicate area cannot be left to the mercies of the traders in human cargoes (be they American, Bahamian, or Haitian) or the clever mannupulations of ambitious lawyers. Part of this rationalization should include:

   (a) An unequivocal legal definition of "political refugee" status. This has to accord with the customary practice in this Hemisphere and not be merely a result of ethnic group politics in this country.

   (b) An understanding that deteriorating economic situations combined with accelerating population growth will only increase the number and intensity of "push" cases while the U.S. will only increase as the dominant "pull" center. A more generous (though no less rigorously implemented) immigration policy for the Caribbean might well be considered on grounds of national security and to encourage greater "openess" in the area now that the radical models of development (especially Cuba) have failed and the region is entering a new search for viable models of development. It is not utopian to see the Caribbean basin eventually as a great new Frontier with greater population movements. Other "pull" countries such as Venezuela should be encouraged to participate in generating a new open geopolitical area. For instance, some 12,000 Jamaicans enter the U.S. with Temporary Work Permits every year; why not the same arrangement for Haitian workers?

This final point requires elaboration. Already stereotypes about the Haitians are crystallizing with enormous rapidity and these might eventually hinder any such "openness". Even Mayors of certain South Florida municipalities are speaking of the Haitians as pockets of "Syphillis and Crime". Nothing could be further from the truth as hard evidence shows: of 406 Haitians arrivals recently arrived, 5 were found to have infectious syphilis — (on the other hand 75% had at least one type of intestinal parasite). The Haitian is perhaps the toughest individual in this Hemisphere: physically strong, spiritually self-dependent and proud, he or she finds joy in hard work, is little prone to drugs, drunkenness or incivility and is extremely honest. Proof of all this are found in the Haitians communities around Belle Glade and Clewiston, the Sugar areas of Palm Beach County were not unexpectedly the Haitians have been graviting towards.

Under different circumstances, large numbers of Haitians would be ideal immigrants. But the circumstances are not different; they are what they are and no amount of charity is going to change that. And that is why we need just rules of law and order: they rationalize the present so as not to foreclose on the tomorrows.

TABLE 1. IMMIGRATION FROM THE WEST INDIES, 1820-1973

Reporting period	Total immigrants
1820	164
1821-30	3,834
1831-40	12,301
1841-50	13,528
1851-60	10,660
1861-70	9,046
1871-80	13,957
1881-90	29,042
1891-1900	33,066
1901-10	107,548
1911-20	123,424
1921-30	74,899
1931-40	15,502
1941-50	49,725
1951-60	123,091
1961-65	110,596
1966	37,909
1967	61,987
1968	110,827
1969	53,190
1970	56,614
1971	66,552
1972	60,506
1973	62,850
Cumulative total (154 years)	1,279,768

The actual number of immigrants from the West Indies in all years after 1917, when Puerto Ricans were granted United States citizenship and thus the right of free entry to the mainland, is higher than these figures indicate because of the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from immigration totals thereafter. This is the only significant change in statistical coverage since 1820.

The total for the decade 1961 to 1970 was 470,213.

SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Annual Report, 1973*, (table 13)

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ESTIMATES OF HAITIAN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
FOR THE 1950-1980 PERIOD

James Allman
Center for Population & Family Health
Columbia University

Prepared for Presentation at the Conference on Carribbean Migration
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ESTIMATES OF HAITIAN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FOR THE 1950-1980 PERIOD

Like most of the island societies in the Caribbean, Haiti has had a long history of migratory movements to both neighboring and more distant lands. The causes for out-migration have been both political and economic. Although emigration is an important factor in contemporary Haitian society and the arrival of Haitians in receiving countries has been frequently in the news during the last decade, knowledge of current trends and their determinants is fragmentary and incomplete. This paper attempts to begin to fill this gap by analyzing Haitian international migration between 1950 and 1980. It first reviews and assesses the available sources of data on migration, including studies done in receiving countries. Then it concludes with a brief consideration of current migration policy and possible future migratory trends.

Sources of Data on Levels and Trends of Haitian Out-Migration

Several statistical sources provide rough indications of the outflow of Haitians during the 1950-1980 period. These include: 1) the 1950 and 1971 Haitian censuses, 2) an examination of information on international migration found in the results of 1971-75 Multiround Demographic Survey, and 3) an examination of census results in countries that receive Haitians. After looking at these sources of data we will also review studies done in the major countries receiving Haitian emigrants in an attempt to provide a reasonable estimate of the approximate numbers of Haitians abroad at the beginning of 1980. Unfortunately, Haitian government data on emigration visas issued is not a valid source of information since the data are incomplete and grossly underestimate outflows.

An indication of substantial out-migration from Haiti is clear in comparing the 1950 and 1971 populations (3,097,220 and 4,329,991 respectively). Yearly population growth during the intercensal period is only 1.6 percent, which is very low for a developing country with little use of modern contraception. The United Nations Population Division compared the expected and the enumerated population in 1971, and computed the survivors from 1950 to 1970 assuming three alternative mortality levels corresponding to levels 9, 10 and 11 in the Coale-Demeny North Model Life Tables. Persons aged 0-4 years in 1950 and 20-24 years in 1970 were excluded from the analysis because they were likely to be affected by the probable underenumeration of infants in the 1950 census. The comparison provides three different estimates of out-migration ranging from 197,000 to 282,000 based on which mortality level is assumed. The excess of the expected population over the enumerated male population is most apparent in the 25-29 and 30-34 age groups. Differences for women were distributed over age groups 25-29 to 55-59. Such an age-sex pattern is not unusual in population with a known history of important emigration (United Nations Population Division, 1974).

Similarly, an analysis of the age and sex structure of the 1971 Census population published in more detail elsewhere (Allman and May, 1979; 506-508) suggests largescale out-migration, particularly of males. The overall sex ratio for the total estimated Haitian population in 1971 was 107 females per 100 males. This relative deficit of males is particularly striking in the age groups from 20 to 39 years. The sex ratios for these age groups are around 125 suggesting the departure of large numbers of men of working age.

A second indication of the extent of out-migration is found in the preliminary results on international migration from the 1971-75 Multiround Demographic Survey. Table 1 shows a total population loss of 22,404 according to the second round of the survey and almost 15,000 for the third round in 1973. The second round may inflate emigration figures somewhat since it was held in February 1973, during the height of the seasonal migration of sugar cane cutters to the Dominican Republic. But many of the seasonal migrants may have remained in the Dominican Republic illegally. Even considering the more conservative estimate from round three, external migration is clearly an important demographic phenomenon in Haiti.

A third approach to estimating Haitian out-migration is to look at census results in countries that receive Haitians. Some of these are provided in Table 2. It should be borne in mind that this approach is likely to underestimate quite seriously the actual numbers of Haitians living abroad since much of their migration is illegal. This is particularly true in the United States and the Dominican Republic, the two most important receiving countries for Haitian emigrants. Similarly, Haitians in the Bahamas, Cuba and possibly Canada might well feel reluctant to be counted.

Before estimating the total number of native-born Haitians currently abroad (i.e. around 1 January 1980), let us review data from major receiving countries on an individual basis and attempt to make adjustments for undernumeration and illegal migrants. In some cases, such as for canada, recent special studies are very helpful in giving estimates of the number of Haitians in the country. But for other major receiving countries (The United States, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas) Haitian migration is such a controversial, emotionally charged issue that an objective, quantitative study is virtually impossible.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States is the most important receiving country for Haitians leaving their country. However, accurate data on the total number of Haitians in the U.S. is difficult to come by. Table 3 provides U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) statistics for the period 1956-1976 on 1) the number of Haitian immigrants to the U.S., 2) the number entering on non-immigrant visas and 3) temporary visas issued to Haitians. If we assume that Haitian immigration to the U.S. between 1977 and 1979 stayed at about the 1976 level, then somewhat less than 100,000 Haitians were legally admitted to the U.S. as immigrants between 1956 and 1980. Since "exact figures for illegal immigrants to the United States are often speculative and believed to be gravely exagerated for political and special interest reasons" (Bryce-Laporte 1979: 218) Providing an estimate of the Haitians in the U.S. is no simple task. Perhaps the best approach is to use the INS data as a basis for estimation (Table 3) since they come from official U.S. sources and probably cover most of the Haitians entering the United States.

If we estimate that about half the Haitians with non-immigrant visas and one-third of those with temporary visas remain in the U.S., then about 322,000 Haitians were living in the U.S. in 1976 (including those with immigrant visas). If we further suppose that the number of Haitians arriving in the U.S. with non-immigrant and temporary visas in 1977-79 were about the same levels as in 1976 (i.e. 50,00 and 30,000 per year respectively), and half of the non-immigrants and one-third of those with temporary visas remained, then the number of Haitians in the U.S. in 1980 (including immigrants, estimated at about 90,823) would be about 440,000 using these figures. Allowing for mortality, return migration, out-migration from the U.S. etc. we estimate the total number of Haitians in the U.S. around 1 January 1980 at about 400,000.

The 1970 United States census enumerated 29,168 native born Haitians (14,201 males and 15,147 females). The above estimates suggest that the census seriously undercounted the actual numbers of Haitians in the United States.

Until the end of 1979 there were not apparently an extensive number of Haitians who entered illegally across borders, with the exception of those who sailed from Haiti or the Bahamas to Florida, and some who crossed from Canada. However, by the end of 1979 the situation began to change dramatically.

A report from the Miami Herald (Tuesday 15 April 1980) noted that 736 illegal Haitian immigrants landed by boat in South Florida the weekend of 12-13 April 1980. The report added that "the latest arrivals bring to more than 3,100 the number of Haitians arriving in South Florida by boat this year." The number of Haitian "boat people" continued to increase, reaching around 1300 per week in May 1980. According to a report issued by the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, Haitians began arriving in Florida by boat in December 1972. (Haiti-Observateur, 27 June-4 July 1980, p.8). The report further estimated that 25-30,000 Haitian boat people arrived in Florida before 19 June 1980.

As of August 1980, it was unsure what the future flows of Haitian "boat people" to the United States would be. The decision by Federal district Judge James L. King, ruling in a class-action lawsuit brought by over 4,000 Haitians, requires the INS, which is critized for its treatment of Haitians, to present a plan to reconsider the request of the Haitian "boat people" for asylum. The decision applies only to the estimated 30,000 Haitians living in Miami as of 20 June. Those arriving after this date may still be subject to deportation (New York Times, 3 July 1980).

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The second major receiving country for Haitian emigrants is the neighboring Dominican Republic. Relations between the two countries have been stormy for over a century (Spitzer, 1972). The Dominican-Haitian border is carefully watched by the respective armies and was closed after the 1937 massacre of Haitians. This, however, did not stop clandestine, illegal migration. In the early 1960's migrant labor agreements brought 30,000 or more Haitians annually for the sugar cane harvest (Segal 1975: 300). Many haitians manage to stay in the Dominican Republic by living in wretched conditions near the estates, finding casual labor in the coffee and rice harvest, or turning to petty trade or casual labor in the cities. Denied Dominican nationalality, sometimes even for their children born in the Dominican Republic, Haitian emigrants are trapped in a poverty little better than what they had known at home. Many emigrants are from villages of Southwest Haiti and are preponderantly adult males in the 20 to 30 age group who are illiterate and unskilled (Segal, 1975: 201; Corten 1970; Hernandez, 1973; Hernandez et al, 1975). J.R. Herard (1975 a : 11) reproduced information from the London based Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights which alleged that 12,000 Haitians are sold yearly in Haiti for $11 per person and resold to Dominican plantation owners as laborers for $60 per person. The transportation of Haitians is supposedly done with the complicity of frontier guards and the Dominican army.

Although an agreement concerning migrant workers was signed by the two governments in November 1978, the extremely difficult conditions Haitians working in Dominican Republic are subjected to did not appreciably improve during the 1979 Zafra (Herald, 1979 b: 30). The Haitian Le Nouvelliste of 19 December 1979 reported a government decision to recruit 14,000 Haitian workers for the 1980 Zafra and the establishment of a joint Haitian-Dominican inspection group that would have representatives from the International Labor Organization. A total of 16,000 Haitians were officially recruited for the 1980 Zafra according to reports published in the local press in January 1980.

The awful plight of Haitians working in the Dominican Republic is not new. For example, the allegation of a situation for Haitians working in the Dominican Republic analogous to the salve trade of pre-independance days was similarly made for earlier periods by Price-Mars (who spoke of the "trafic Negrier") and Paul Moral (1959 : 41).

It is very difficult to estimate the number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic around 1980. As Segal (1975 : 211) points out "estimates are complicated by confusion over recruited migrant laborers expected to return to Haiti, migrants laborers who fail to return, and Haitians born in the Dominican Republic who may not acquire Dominican nationality, especially if their parents entered illegally". He cites Cortern's estimate of 100,000 as a likely figure for "the maximum number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic in 1973". At the end of the decade, the number may have increased somewhat to around 115,000, but this estimate is very speculative.

CANADA

The Haitian population of Canada numbered only a few dozen around 1950 and until 1965 consisted primarily of medical doctors, nurses and laboratory technicians. By 1965 there were approximately 1000 Haitian professionals and students in Canada. Official immigration data for 1963-1976 indicate that 17,811 Haitians were admitted during this period. The increase was related both to the worsening economic and political situation in Haiti as well as to the Canadian government's encouragement of immigration beginning with the publication 1966 of the "libre blanc sur l'immigration" and the ruling in 1966 that allowed visitors to Canada to apply for permanent resident status while in the country. In 1972 the Canadian government again modified their immigration policy making it more difficult for foreigners to acquire admission. Between 1972 and 1974 a regularization took place of the status of many foreigners living in Canada (Operation Mon Pays) who wanted to remain (Rousseau, 1978: 1-8).

The Rousseau Report (1978), prepared for the Canadian Immigration Service, estimated that in 1978 approximately 25,000 Haitians were living in Canada. Of these, 15,000 were workers, mostly arrivals after 1970. Of those admitted between 1973-1976, 498 were men and 518 were women. Almost 60% of this group were between the ages of 20 and 34 years old (p. 20). Further almost 97% of this group were living in the province of Quebec, with 92% in the metropolitan Montreal area (p. 14 and 16). Data on the economically active Haitian population admitted between 1965-1976 (a total of 11,328 persons) indicated that 46% were blue collar workers and 54% were in white collar jobs (p. 23).

An indeterminate number of Haitians arriving in Canada do not stay but make their way to the United States. St. John-Jones (1979:1922) estimates that 55% of the emigrants from the West Indies to Canada between mid-1961 and mid-1971 migrated to the United States. But he does not provide data on the Haitian population.

The estimate of 25,000 Haitians living in Canada provided in the Rousseau report attempts to take into account students without migrant visas, estimated at 2,604 for the 1973-1976 period- (p. 22) and children born to migrants as well as deaths and departures of Haitians immigrants. The Rousseau estimate is probably a conservative one. If an adjustment is made for the number of Haitians living and working in Canada illegally, the total Haitian population as of 1 January 1980 might well be around 40,000 persons.

Other Receiving Countries

The proximity of the Bahamas Islands and the need for labor there due to a booming tourist industry has made them a target for Haitian emigrants. The Bahamas Government has taken various measures to deal with "The problem of the continuing, and apparently increasing, illegal entry of Haitians" (Marshall, 1978). Beginning in the summer of 1978 a campaign to expulse Haitians was initiated by the Bahamas Government and led hundreds of Haitians to take to boats in an attempt to land on the southern coast of Florida. This movement has continued in 1979 and 1980 leading to tragic incidents widely reported in the international press.

The Haitians living in the Bahamas were estimated at about 20,000 before the expulsions. They may number about 10,000 around the beginning of 1980.

Cuba no longer admits Haitian migrants. French Guyana has admitted about 2,000 Haitians in recent years and others have settled in Martinique and Guadeloupe (Domenach and Guengant, forthcoming).

Haitian students and educated professionals continue to make their way to European countries and to Africa. In addition, there are Haitian communities in various Latin American countries as Table 2 indicates.

Table 4 estimates the number of Haitians abroad at the beginning of 1980 at about 600,000 based on the data for the 1950-1980 intercensal period, the results of the Multiround Demographic Survey, and the data discussed above from individual receiving countries. This estimate is a conservative one and the numbers of Haitians abroad could conceivably be 10-20 percent higher. In any case, the Haitians abroad make up at least 12 percent of all Haitians, if we consider the number of Haitians in the country to number approximately 5,000,000 in 1980 (Haiti, 1980: 12). Taking into account more recent outflows, our estimate roughly corresponds with Vilgrain's 1976 estimate of approximately 500,000 Haitians abroad (1976 : 3).

Current Policies and Perspectives Regarding Haitian Migration

An indication of future trends in Haitian out-migration requires a look at the migration policies of the Haitian government as well as those of receiving countries. Concerning migration policy in Haiti, Segal (1975: 197) in the early 1970's noted that "encouragement or sponsorship of emigration is not a government population policy...instead, it is a business whereby the Haitian government seeks to extract, whether from the educated elite or the unskilled laborer seeking to leave the country, a substantial sum of money. Once the migrant is out, the government makes a continued effort to take a cut of any remittances that he may send back". The cost of a passport and exit visa renewable at a fee of $100 each time, plus the cost of a compulsory travel insurance policy from the government and exit and other taxes supported Segal's contention.

The situation of the departing Haitian has recently improved somewhat with the issuing of the 1979 Immigration and Emigration Law. An ordinary Haitian passport is now issued valid for one, two or five years; the fees to be paid for a passport, all taxes included, are $29, $39 and $49 respectively (p. 31). An Haitian with an ordinary passport wishing to travel abroad must obtain a visa of departure before leaving the country. This costs $7 for a visa good for three months and $84 for a multiple exit visa good for one year. Haitians remaining outside the country for more than three months must obtain a return visa from the diplomatic or consular official in the country they are visiting (p.32).

Haitians leaving the country illegally for Florida and the Dominican Republic are still exploited ruthlessly and are put in peril of their lives by those who provide transport at exhorbitant prices. Radio reports on Haitians stopped in boats in the process of attempting to leave during August 1980, found that passengers paid between $1,000 and $1,300 for passage.

The Haitian government has yet to put forth a coherent population policy which would include an assessment of the demographic and socio-economic implications of extensive out-migration. The major factor controlling the flow of Haitians out of Haiti appears to be the barriers receiving countries errect to prevent them from entering. Unless there are dramatic and unforeseeable changes, it seems likely that Haitians will continue to attempt to emmigrate as in the past. The main destinations will be the United States and the Dominican Republic, Canada, neighboring Caribbean and Latin American countries and, to a lesser degree, and primarily among the educated, to Europe and Africa.

Only sustained economic development will be able to alter the desire of many Haitians in diverse social and economic circumstances to want to leave their country. These changes will require a much stronger government commitment to development than is currently evident, as well as substantial, long-term inputs of international monetary and technical assistance. A clear, well defined population policy, which would include a focus on migration, might help considerably in resolving the extremely difficult population and social welfare problems that Haiti will face in the future.

*This paper draws on an earlier study entitled "Haitian International Migration, 1950-1980, Recent Trends and their Implications", by J. Allman and J. May, submitted to the International Migration Review in June, 1980.

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TABLE 1

Estimates of International Migration from Haiti, Multi-Round Demographic Survey, the Second and Third Rounds, Average for One Year

Country	Round	Males			Females			Total Emigrants Less Immigrants For both Sexes
		Emigrants	Immigrants	Balance	Emigrants	Immigrants	Balance	
United States	2nd	3 065	458	2 607	2 785	646	2 139	4 746
	3rd	3 702	402	3 300	4 656	462	4 194	7 494
Canada	2nd	1 186	203	983	1 603	258	1 345	3 328
	3rd	1 489	342	1 147	1 821	191	1 630	2 777
Dominican Republic	2nd	12 654	110	12 544	468	83	385	12 929
	3rd	2 138	2 520	-382	596	189	407	25
Rest of the World	2nd	2 807	915	1 892	1 041	532	509	2 401
	3rd	3 483	899	2 584	2 479	618	1 831	4 415
Total	2nd	19 712	1 686	18 026	5 897	1 519	4 378	22 404
	3rd	10 812	4 163	6 649	9 552	1 490	8 062	14 711

Source: Haiti, Institut Haitian de Statistique, Résultats Préliminaires de L'Enquête Démographique à Passages Répétés, 3 Avril 1975:169

TABLE 2

HAITIAN BORN POPULATIONS RECORDED AT VARIOUS CENSUSES

Country	Year	Males	Females	Total
Dominican Republic	1950	13,543	5,650	19,193
	1960	23,330	6,170	29,500
	1970	14,152	4,913	19,065
United States	1960	2,239	2,577	4,816
	1970	14,021	15,147	29,168
Canada	1971	--	--	4,260
Bahamas*	1970	4,268	1,883	6,151
Chile*	1970	--	--	52
Venezuela*	1971	187	158	345
Puerto Rico*	1970	157	162	319
Brazil*	1970	48	42	90
Panama*	1970	19	53	72
Cuba	1953	29,945	3,958	33,903
	1970	19,997	2,602	22,579
El Salvador*	1971	--	--	28
Argentina	1960	--	--	30
Costa Rica	1973			15
Guatemala	1973			15
West Gernamy	1970	--	--	335
Sweden	1970	--	--	183
Switzerland	1970	--	--	157

Source: John Hobcraft, 1977:34 and, for those marked with * 1977 United Nations Demographic Yearbook

TABLE 3

Haitians Entering the U.S.A. from 1956 to 1976 According to Types of Visas

Year	Immigrants	Non-Immigrants	Temporary Visitors
1956	620	3 175	2 148
1957	405	2 834	1 922
1958	766	3 195	1 992
1959	543	3 948	2 412
1960	931	4 107	2 568
1961	1 025	3 832	2 314
1962	1 322	4 694	2 832
1963	1 851	4 650	2 799
1964	2 082	6 341	4 399
1965	3 609	8 090	5 607
1966	3 801	9 271	5 512
1967	3 567	10 990	6 375
1968	6 086	17 259	9 948
1969	6 542	19 209	10 876
1970	6 932	24 535	12 869
1971	7 444	25 299	14 878
1972	5 809	28 351	13 108
1973	4 786	32 523	15 268
1974	3 946	37 287	17 518
1975	5 145	42 589	22 613
1976	5 410	49 875	28 769
TQ-76*	1 281	21 059	11 867
	74 623	363 113	198 594

*Immigration and Naturalization Service Statistics covered the U.S. fiscal years ending June 30. The transition quarter (TQ) for 1976 covers the 3-month period, July-September 1976.

Source: 1976 Annual Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service: 89-91.

TABLE 4

Estimates of Haitians Living Abroad by Country of Residence
1 January 1980

	Country	Number
North America:	United States	400,000
	Canada	40,000
Caribbean:	Dominican Republic	115,000
	Bahamas	10,000
	Cuba	15,000
	Martinique and Guadeloupe	5,000
	Puerto Rico	500
Latin America:	Venezuela	600
	Mexico	400
	Columbia	200
	Brazil	300
	Panama	200
	Guyana	300
	French Guyana	2,000
	Other Latin American Countries	1,000
Europe:	France	5,000
	Other Europe countries (esp. West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden)	2,500
Africa:		2,000
	Total	600,000

WEST INDIAN MIGRATION
: HISTORICAL NOTES AND CONTEMPORATY TRENDS

BY

Dawn I. Marshall
Research Fellow, I.S.E.R.
University of the West Indies
Barbados

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WEST INDIAN MIGRATION
: HISTORICAL NOTES AND CONTEMPORARY TRENDS

There may be some of you in the audience who feel that a paper on West Indian migration is somewhat out of place at a gathering such as this. The main objective of the meeting is to examine U. S. policy, and the implications of this policy, towards refugees focusing particularly on the consequences from the peninsula of Florida. It is only by stretching the concept of refugee to include fugitives from economic deprivation that we could include West Indians. But if you question a discussion on West Indian migrants then I would also have to question the inclusion of Haitians as refugees. Although the major underlying consideration in admitting refugees is ostensibly humanitarian, I think most of us would accept that the overriding considerations are political. Migration, on the other hand, is usually explained in economic terms. Thus refugees are admitted outside the framework of the basic immigration law. Of the three groups being considered here tonight only the Cubans should truly be classified as refugees. The blurring of distinctions between refugee and migrant experienced with the Haitian movement illustrate the problems involved in formulating and administering immigration policies.

This paper present a brief historical review of West Indian migration. This historical perspective allows us to see that, except for the period between 1924 and the Second World War, West Indian migration has been continuous and can be viewed as a fairly successful adaptation to the social and economic needs of the Caribbean.

MOVEMENT WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN:

Roberts(1) divides the demographic history of the Commonwealth Caribbean into five phases of development: the first lasting from initial settlement until the late eighteenth century when there was considerable immigration, especially of slaves, into the Caribbean; the second from the late eighteenth century until Emancipation when planters tried to maintain their slave populations by natural increase. The third, which started with Emancipation and lasted until the late nineteenth century, was characterised both by immigration into the region (especially of indentured Indians) and by inter-Caribbean migration especially from the smaller, older colonies to Trinidad and British Guiana which were less densely settled. It is worth noting that in this third phase the wage differential was considered an important motive for migration by the newly-freed slaves. Wage rates in Trinidad were double those on the other islands, and Barbadian workers, for instance, as early as 1840, were insisting on "their undoubted right to carry their labour to the best market".(2) The main concern of all three of these phases was the concern of the planters: the maintenance of an ample labour supply for the sugar plantations.

The fourth phase from 1880 to 1920 was marked by a decline in the inter-Caribbean movement and an increase in extra-Commonwealth-Caribbean migration. These movements to the canal zone in Panama, to the banana republics in Central America, to the sugar plantations of Cuba and the Dominican Republic or to the refineries of Curacao were the result of a demand for labour created by the expansion of a specific economic sector or venture. In almost every case this expansion was the result of U. S. investments. Although only a small proportion of the actual movements were to the U.S., they were certainly movements in search of the "yankee dollar". Thus, experience of work in menial jobs, the discriminatory practice of lower wage rates and finally the closure of opportunities by racially discriminatory immigration legislation were all part of a tradition established by West Indian migrant labour working for U. S. companies. Haitians also participated in some of these movements e.g. to Cuba and to the Dominican Republic and it is significant that they were also victims of discriminatory practices.

The fifth phase began with a period of over twenty years of no out-migration; instead West Indians were actually being repatriated e.g. from the U. S. because of reduced employment opportunities caused by the Depression. During this period there was also a conspicuous reduction in mortality rates in the Caribbean and as a result the rates of natural increase of population rose steeply. The 1930's were also a period of social change culminating in the Caribbean-wide riots of the late 1930's. More than one observer commented on the need for emigration opportunities at this time while the West India Commission which investigated the disturbances saw this lack as an important element in the disturbances:

> " this extreme difficulty of movement... creates a sense of being shut in, of being denied opportunity and choice, and of subsequent frustration in the minds of many young men... it may be a more important element than appears at first in the psychology of discontent"(3)

By this time, I think it would be true to say that a common West Indian policy had evolved towards migration. Immediately after emancipation the fear of a labour shortage had caused the planter governments to impose numerous restrictions on emigration. But by the late nineteenth century, increase population growth together with the shifting fortunes of sugar had caused most territories to view emigration as an important safety valve for population pressure. The experience of the early twentieth century, when there were no emigration outlets, further reinforced this view.

MOVEMENT TO THE METROPOLES:

With World War II, American workers were absorbed by the armed forces, and migrant workers were allowed in to fill the labour shortages. The majority of these were Mexicans under the Bracero programme, but West Indians were also allowed in. Roberts suggests that this war-time renewal of migration might be considered the beginning of a sixth phase in West Indian demographic development. It marked the beginning of the movement by West Indians to metropolitan countries as opposed to metropolitan economic ventures in Caribbean territories. The possibilities of permanent migration became greater as West Indians lived and worked among metropolitan peoples instead of only in labour camps. And, of course, metropolitan governments therefore also found it necessary to impose more controls and restrictions on West Indian movements.

While a substantial number of West Indians entered the United States during World War II, the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952 is believed to have reduced the flow of West Indian immigrants "to a mere trickle"(4). Available statistics, however, show that the legal immigration of West Indians into the U.S. for the decade 1951 to 1960 was almost three times greater than for the previous decade. Because of their new status as independent countries, Jamaica, Trinidad and after 1966 Barbados, benefited from the 1965 Immigration Amendments. As a result West Indian immigration to the U.S. for the decade 1961 to 1970 more than tripled previous rates.

TABLE 1

WEST INDIAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

PERIOD	NUMBERS	PERIOD	NUMBERS	PERIOD	NUMBERS
1891-1900	33,066	1921-1930	74,899	1951-1960	123,091
1901-1910	107,548	1931-1940	15,502	1961-1970	470,213
1911-1920	123,424	1941-1950	49,725	1971-1974	251,052

Source: Justus(5); "West Indians in Los Angeles" p.130

The West Indian movement to the United Kingdom also had its origins in the Second World War, when West Indians who went to Britain to support the war effort of the mother country were exposed to British conditions and opportunities. However, not until the 1950's did the stream become significant and it is generally accepted that the U. S. Immigration Act of 1952 - the Walter-McCarran Act - was partly responsible for this deflection to the United Kingdom. Although the movement was not massive, citizens of the United Kingdom reacted strongly to this black invasion and their Government moved to halt the movement by hasty legislation. It was in the two-year period before the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 that fifty-five percent of the West Indian immigrants entered the United Kingdom, anxious to be admitted before "the door slammed"(6). The 1962 Act controlled immigration to the U. K. while the 1965 White Paper on Immigration from the Commonwealth established the principle on which all future legislation was to be based. "The principles were quite simply that black people were, in themselves, a problem and that the fewer we had of them in the U. K., the better it would be."(7)

This migration has generated much literature, primarily concerned with the problems involved in the adjustment of West Indians in the United Kingdom, and of the U.K. to West Indians. The immigration to the U. K. has more or less ceased but the "problems" created by their presence in that receiving country persist.

The movement from the Commonwealth Caribbean to Canada has been comparatively small. It is also a recent movement, for up until 1962 the discriminatory bias of Canadian immigration laws was explicit. As early as 1815 the immigration of blacks was disallowed because they were "unfitted by nature to the climate and to association with the rest of the colonists."(8) Even postwar immigration policy that recognized the need for a population increase to enable Canada to achieve its economic potential did not remove the racial bias against blacks and Chinese.

It was not until 1962 that the racial discriminatory provisions were largely removed and entry was based on education, skill and training. Thus, seventy-five percent of the immigrants admitted to Canada directly from the West Indies entered after 1962. Except for those entering Canada under the West Indian Domestic servants scheme since 1955, the movement has been highly selective of professional, white collar and skilled workers.

This same bias towards the educated and skilled is found in the present U. S. legislation although the 1965 Amendments also created a preference system in which most visas are allocated on the basis of family relationship to a U. S. citizen or resident. Racial and ethnic discrimination were officially eliminated with the country-of-origin quota system in 1965 while the 1976 Amendments made the provisions of law the same for the East and West hemisphere. Perhaps more important for the West Indies, however, was the 1976 Health Professions Educational Assistance Act which attempted to control the admissions of foreign medical graduates -

as North and LeBel phrase it 'the rich, the talented and in many cases the well-educated, are treated differently under the immigration law from others and have been so for a long time.... Until recently the two classes most over-represented among legal immigrants were physicians, at one end of the scale, and live-in maids at the other."(9) With the closure of the U. K. migration outlet and the tighter, more selective immigration policies of the U. S. and Canada, it seems that opportunities for large scale Caribbean migration has ended.

But even with restricted migration opportunities the net loss to Barbados between 1960 and 1970 was 39,000, a migration dominated by females. Although this decade was officially associated with the virtual cessation of emigration,(10) the annual rate of total population increase in Barbados was only 0.12 per cent, practically zero growth. St. Kitts-Nevis experienced the same pattern between 1960 and 1970, a net out-migration dominated by females. Traditionally, movement out of the Caribbean territories has been dominated by young males. This trend started because of the type of manual labour needed by most of the receiving countries. The dominance of female migrants in the movements since 1960 is therefore a new trend, and one that has been noted only through examinations of the Census figures. Has the movement by domestic servants and nurses been sufficient to cause this change? This is one of the aspects of contemporary West Indian migration which needs investigation at the empirical level. Verbal communication of the preliminary 1980 Census count show an increase of only two or three hundred over 1970 for St. Kitts, and a 21.4

percent decline in population for Nevis. Clearly out-migration continues, and given the selective nature of the policies of the present receiving countries, we must assume that emigration is now causing a loss of valuable, skilled human resources.

PERCEPTIONS OF EMIGRATION:

It is important to realize that this view of migration as a loss of valuable resources is relatively new to the Caribbean. Except for the early planter resistance, West Indians and West Indian governments here perceived migration very positively. The main advantage perceived at the national level has been the relief of population pressure, and the importance of this safety valve was particularly appreciated during the time when there were no migration outlets. The West India Commission, for instance, felt that "no internal reform can, however, outcome the necessity of finding an outlet for part of the rapidly increasing population."(11)

As a result of emigration the annual population growth rates have remained low, so that the perception of emigration as an effective control of population is an accurate one. The Barbadian Government perhaps took matters to extremes when in 1965 it felt it necessary to provide training in desired skills because it had "become quite obvious that hardly any country is interested in taking unskilled migrants".(12) But this does demonstrate that West Indians have only accepted the reality of a brain drain for a relatively short time.

The other perception usually associated with emigration in the Caribbean is that of the receipt of remittances. Both in Barbados and in St. Kitts "Panama Money" was used in the early twentieth century to purchase land and livestock. The importance of building a house is still considered very important in the West Indies and is one of the traditional investments made by West Indian migrants overseas. Although it cannot be documented at this stage, there is a general belief that many of the new wall houses which are being erected in St. Vincent are being built with remittance by parents and family for migrants overseas. Very few of these houses could have been built by domestic savings alone, especially in an island like St. Vincent which has a fairly stagnant economy. Migration then is accepted as one of the few available means of "bettering oneself". Education is another of the generally accepted channels of social mobility, and quite often, this also is attained by movement out of the Caribbean.

Except for the recent awareness of the disadvantages of the movement of skilled persons, there appears to be no perception of a negative impact of migration, either at the individual or at the national level. A general strategy of West Indians, therefore, is to pursue all opportunities for emigration, wherever they have occurred and to whatever country.

Newspapers continually carry success stories of West Indians who have prospered overseas, of West Indian associations overseas which are able to assist clubs, hospitals or children's homes in the Caribbean. Thus the possibility of migration is well-known, the success story of migration in terms of economic and social mobility is ubiquitous, and migration is generally accepted as a very realistic option. Moreover, the post-war trend of migration to the developed world and especially to the U.S., adds new dimensions. Compared to the U. S. any island in the Caribbean can offer very few opportunities. Migration to the U.S. does not limit the individual to manual work as it did in Panama or Cuba, but rather it opens a Pandora's box of options.

U. S. RESPONSES:

One is not sure to what extent U. S. policy-makers understand the significance of migration in the Caribbean. A good example comes not from the West Indian experience but from the Haitian. This current movement of Haitian "boat people", as they are now being called, escalated because of a change in U. S. Immigration Regulations which allowed Haitians to work in the U. S. while their immigration status was being determined. The U. S. has always been a preferred distination for Haitians, New York, even more than Miami, but it had been the practice of U. S. Immigration officials to deport or repatriate any Haitian nationals trying to illegally enter the U.S. very quickly. The Coast Guard has even refused to land Haitians from sloops in distress on U.S. soil and have landed them instead in Nassau because their boats were floundering in Bahamian waters.(13) Once the word got around that Haitians were being allowed to work instead of being deported, it is not surprising that the movement escalated. The economic motive of the movement was being fulfilled, regardless of the legal status of the individual.

One suspects that the large number of visa-abusers resulting from the West Indian entries into the U.S. is the result of a similar realistic assessment of their chances by West Indians. I understand that more than twenty-five per cent of the Barbadian farm workers recruited to work in the Florida cane-fields last year became visa-abusers. It is known that very few visa-abusers are apprehended by the U. S. Immigration officers. Very few West Indians would consider a visa-abuser to be a criminal. The worst that could happen is that the individual would be caught and not allowed entry into the U. S. again. And there are many West Indians willing to take such a risk, for the chance of opening Pandora's box.

The point has been made that U. S. immigration laws are made within the political and economic context of the times.(14) But it seems that the context is mainly that of the U. S., and that the social realities of the sending countries are not always taken into consideration. Our historical review of West Indian migration, for example, showed that such changes as took place reflected changes in the receiving country's needs. The basic indulging need for employment opportunities has persisted in the Caribbean and West Indian migrants have had to shift their destinations according to which countries were willing to receive them at any particular time.

North and Le Bel are concerned, as no doubt many others are, that the U. S. should not permit a two-class society to develop:an elite class of priveleged, legal workers and employers versus an underclass of less than equal illegal workers who are exploited and under-paid - by U. S. standards. The implication is that by not enforcing current Immigration laws and regulations, the U. S. Government is condoning this two-tiered system. While one accepts this as an admirable principle, it is difficult to see how it can be achieved. While international migration take place against a background of mutual necessity by both sending and receiving countries, this background is essentially a movement between unequals (16) a movement from developing countries with a surplus of labour to developed countries with an abundance of capital. Because labour shortages represent a constraint on the economic growth of countries like the U.S. their governments permit the immigration of workers attracted by the wage differential. This differential is such that these workers are willing to work for lower wages and less desirable jobs. Migrants therefore introduce an element of flexibility into the labour market, and if these migrants have either entered the country illegally or are working illegally, the degree of flexibility and profitability increases. The need for short-term labour inputs further complicates the matter, so that farm workers needed for harvesting are admitted for a few months at a time on the understanding that they will not become permanent additions to the American labour force.

The question therefore is: does present U. S. Immigration Policy adequately reflect these needs of the U. S. Labour market? In practice it does, because regulations against illegals and visa-abusers are not enforced. But de jure Immigration legislation is based on the premise that all people who want to work in the U. S. necessarily wish to remain in the U. S. permanently and become assimilated into the U. S. population. This is not necessarily true, and an expression of a strong intention to return by migrants pervades the literature on Caribbean migration. While it is certainly true that, in the majority of cases, this intention to return is not realized, one wonders to what extent U. S. Immigration policy frustrates this realization. Visa-abusers, for instance, could not leave the country unless they were certain that they did not want to return. I'm suggesting here that the bias towards the skilled, the professional and the educated encourages abuse of the immigration law by those who cannot meet its stringent qualifications.

Let me suggest another possible effect of this bias which I think merits discussion. The Caribbean at present is in a state of turmoil in its efforts to effect social change against under-development. Social change is seldom the result of a single factor, but it is worth reflecting that the most recent period of social change in the Caribbean was also a period of very limited opportunities for outward movement. It is impossible for us to say to what extent this extreme difficulty of movement is an element in the present psychology of discontent. Certainly, if only the skilled are allowed to migrate, then migration can no longer operate as the traditionally effective safety valve for certain stresses and strains in West Indian societies. Those who are most likely to suffer unemployment and deprivation are not likely to be preferred migrants. We know that the U. S. tends to view the Caribbean primarily in geo-political and strategic terms - the presence of the Cuban refugees in Florida is eloquent testimony to that. I am suggesting that such a view cannot ignore the role that migration plays, and has played in the Caribbean.

Implicit in this paper so far has been a plea for all receiving countries, and in particular the U.S., to acknowledge the need for careful and sensitive responses to Caribbean migration. I think this is extremely important, but I would hate to give the impression that the onus is on the receiving countries. Patterns of migration have changed and metropolitan countries have begun to impose such restrictions on the movement of Caribbean peoples that Caribbean governments must look more critically at emigration and its role in the development process.

The view of migration as a safety valve evolved while most of the Commonwealth Caribbean territories were colonies, and dependent on Great Britain. This view was part and parcel of the colonial view which saw the crux of the West Indian problem as the co-existence of demands for a better life and unfavourable economic trends, but which saw no possibilities for supplying the better life except by expenditure from outside resources. Despite the new world economic order, one feels that this is still a fairly realistic assessment of Caribbean possibilities. Nevertheless, since the 1960's, as a result of the work of the New World economists, and as a result of political independence, development has come to mean to some Caribbean peoples an attempted movement away from dependence towards greater autonomy and self-reliance. Such development is far from being achieved, but as a Caribbean person I would like to see some attempt by Caribbean governments to forge a Caribbean view of migration which reflects this movement towards self-reliance.

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The 'Freedom Flotilla' Cuban Emigrants

by

Robert L. Bach

The Brookings Institution

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In mid-April the Cuban government, by announcing it had withdrawn "protection from the Florida corridor," triggered the flight of over 117,000 new Cuban refugees to the United States. This might have been merely the latest addition to the exodus that began in 1959, except that from the outset neither the Cuban nor U.S. government had control over the character or volume of the emigrants. Castro had evidently underestimated the response to the advertised opportunity to leave. And the U.S. was trapped between an international political and legal pledge and the reality of an unknown number of new immigrants landing in South Florida.

"Right now," said Victor Palmeiri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, "we're in a situation where we can't let them in and can't stop them from coming in, contradictory as it may sound."[1] Part of the dilemma was due to the rush of Cuban-Americans to Mariel Bay to rescue their relatives, which because it was in violation of U.S. law was nothing less than a "civil uprising." As for the reception in South Florida, by May 7th Tony Ojeda, refugee coordinator for Dade County, was desperate: "We are now in a crisis situation. We're reaching the physical point where we can't hold any more of these people..."[2]

I arrived at Opa Locke Airport in North Miami on May 9 expecting the worst; thousands of Cuban emigrants massed disorderly waiting for the paperwork that stood between them and their relatives. I found something different. Across the street from the airport hanger was a traffic sign - the metal kind found along any highway - that read "Refugee Family Parking." It suggested order, even routine, as if parents parked there each year to pick up their kinds from camp. Not that this would be a desirable camp: the hanger in which U.S. officials questioned the Cubans looked like the rotting barns you would warn children not to play in. Still there was little evidence of confusion as inside the Cubans filed past rows of tables, stopping regularly to talk with temporarily reassigned bureaucrats and volunteers and to fill out those ever present forms. It was a stark contrast to the public image of the resettlement operation; the local resettlement workers and the relatives and friends waiting outside the compound's fence seemed to know exactly what to do, if not with some frustration how fast it could be done. But why, then, was there the alarming stories of chaos and conflict?

Much of the confusion and bewilderment that caught the reporter's eye and overwhelmed local officials like Mr. Ojeda resulted from the international dilemma and, specifically, the Carter Administration's delay in declaring a legal status for the Cubans. The Administration faced a tough policy question. The historical policy of "open arms" for Cuban emigrants and the Cuban-American community's expectations that this group would be treated the same argued for accepting them quickly and giving them full "refugee status" under the Refugee Act of 1980. Foreign policy reinforced this view: once again here was a demonstration of the failure of the Castro government.

Yet the Administration was wary not to create in haste an unwarranted precedent. Unlike the previous flows, this one lacked order and due process, making it impossible to screen undersirables before their departure from Cuba.[3] There was also the possibility that to embrace these migrants as refugees would open the Florida coast to an onslaught of Caribbean poor. Fifteen thousand Haitian "boat people" in Miami were enough to give substance to that concern.

But clearly the most troublesome issue was the cost of resettlement. In a period of fiscal restraint and recession President Carter decided not to grant the Cubans the generous benefits of refugee status (e.g., 100% federal reimbursement of refugee assistance costs). Instead, in late June the Administration announced that the newcomers would be treated as applicants for asylum, and that special legislation would be sought to resolve both the Cuban and Haitian legal status. Until that legislation is adopted, Cubans arriving between April 21 and June 19, and all Haitians processed by INS before June 19, would have their parole status extended for six more months.

Meanwhile, the delay in reaching this decision created problems and set precedents. The Miami Herald editorialized, overdramatically, that Washington's inaction was "obscenely callous toward the real human suffering that's taking place in Miami and the Keys."[4] The voluntary agencies, who in current refugee policy have primary responsibility for resettlement, were left to struggle without Federal reimbursement for finding sponsors and relocating the refugees. Frustration tired the voluntary workers. "It is absolutely chaotic," said Donald Hohl, associate director of the U.S. Catholic Conference. "We're in an uncontrolled situation. It's like a mammoth monster, a lumbering giant on its own course."[5] And representatives of the local Miami government, Dade County, and Florida - as well as the other states where additional processing camps would be located - worried that without a declaration of refugee status their budgets would have to absorb the additional costs of medical and cash assistance.

In addition, without a status, these "Freedom Flotilla" emigrants were actually undocumented aliens, illegally transported to the U.S. by U.S. citizens. But unlike other illegal aliens who are subject to deportation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service promptly accepted their application for status, gave them a visa, and authorization to work in the U.S.

As if all this wasn't enough, the President also faced a tough political reality; in part the consequence of an anti-immigration public sentiment characteristic of bad economic times. A CBS/N.Y. Times poll, for example, found that almost half of those sampled opposed admitting more Cubans. Lack of jobs was a primary reason. The State Department received calls and telegrams that ran heavily against the boatlift and Senator Chiles (D-Fla.) reported an 80% negative constituent response.[6]

Some responsibility for this public mood must lie with the public characterization of these Cubans. Granma, the Cuban communist party newspaper, charged that those who left were "social dregs," "delinquents," "scum." "Lumpen," short for lumpenproletariat, became the standard phrase for the Mariel refugees. Many reports in U.S. newspapers echoed the theme, focusing attention on the "social undesirables;" prisoners, the disabled, mental patients, etc.

Of course there was little question that compared to the "Golden Exile" of the 1960s, when wealthy businessmen, professionals, and managers migrated en masse, this latest wave of Cubans fared poorly. But after my initial disillusionment at Opa Locke Airport with public images, I decided to check on this characterization too. At Opa Locke again I stood by the rear gate of the compound where after processing the MPs would release the Cubans with relatives in Miami. Excluding the lunch-size, Red Cross bags that held their remaining possessions, the emigrants were virtually indistinguishable from the families and friends embracing them. The newcomers looked nourished and healthy, but tired. There were exceptions. Inside the hanger a woman wearing plain brown clothes stared uncomfortably at the floor, then at the walls. She proved to be one of the mental patients reported on so frequently and was soon escorted away by medical volunteers. Turning away, however, I saw several family groups file up to temporarily idle INS interviewers.

I left this test of the public image skeptical, but equally unconvinced with my own observations. After all they too were merely impressions. Clearly there was, and still is, a need for systematic descriptive data to judge more accurately the background character of these refugees. Correct information, presumably, is an antidote to confusion and chaos.

The Miami Profile

Information on the Cubans was hard to find. The computerized reporting system at Opa Locke Airport produced valuable but limited information. Fortunately two better sources were available.

The first was the registration records of the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Coral Gables. President Eisenhower had established the Center in 1960 to handle the first wave of Cuban emigrants, and President Kennedy expanded the resettlement program a year later. Thus the Center was the logical place to receive this latest group.

The Center registered nearly 2,000 of the first to reach Miami. But, as the influx accelerated and the responsibility passed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency,[7] processing operations moved to Tamiami Park and, subsequently, to Opa Locke Airport. President Carter later opened another processing center in Florida, Eglin Air Force Base, followed by bases in Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

I extracted from the Center's registration records a 50% systematic random sample, including information on age, sex, education, and occupation.

There were 1,937 records in all and each person had arrived before April 29. A 10% subsample included additional information on marital status, knowledge of English, last place of residence in Cuba, and relatives and friends in the U.S.

Since these registrations represented only the earliest arrivals, I also sampled the INS biographical data forms for 633 persons processed at Opa Locke Airport. These were later arrivals, between May 9 and 13. INS files these forms only for persons 14 years old and over. Given the pace of processing at the Airport, I was able to pull only 10% of these records, thus yielding a rather small sample size. Nevertheless, the two samples taken together provide a clear profile of those arriving in the Miami area.[8]

Most of the early arrivals had jumped the gates of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, thus initiating this latest flight. They were older than those processed at Opa Locke and less likely to have relatives or friends already in the U.S. There were also more men in this first group and fewer that were married. But these differences are inconsequential compared to the overall profile. The majority of those registered in Miami-Dade County were working age males, many came with families, and over 70% had relatives or friends awaiting them.

Additional information available only for the earliest arrivals indicated that 90% gave their last place of residence as the province of Havana. Most lived in the capital city. Almost no one (5%) could speak or understand English, even though their average years of schooling in Cuba was about the same as earlier Cuban refugees who could. Their nine years of school, on average, was much lower than the Cuban refugees leaving in the early 1960s, but similar to those arriving in the 1970s.

For those arriving in Miami the charge of "social dreg", "undesirable", or "lumpen" seems incorrect. If "dreg" refers to unemployed, only one person sampled among the earliest arrivals reported no occupation prior to leaving. If "undesirable" means "out of the labor force," only 18% would be considered so by U.S. classifications: eleven percent said they were students, six percent homemakers, ten persons retired, and two emigrants were in the military. And, if "lumpen" means marginally employed, by U.S. classifications the majority were solidly working class; craft workers, factory laborers, equipment operators, and professionals or technicians. This included mechanics, plumbers, crane and large equipment operatives, carpenters, and masons. Twenty percent of the professionals were teachers and, of those sampled, there were physicians, nurses, professors, accountants, and computer operators. Evidently many skilled workers were among the first to accept the offer to leave.

The Cubans arriving later and registering at Opa Locke reported fewer skilled jobs. There were fewer professionals, more bus, taxi, and truck drivers, and far more service workers. Yet the greatest difference was the proportion who neither held nor sought a job. The Cubans processed at Opa Locke were nearly twice as likely as the earlier group to be homemakers, students, or retired.

The "Flotilla" emigrants also had occupational experiences in Cuba that are remarkably similar to the types of jobs they will most likely encounter in the Miami economy.[9] This is, as an aside, unlike many other groups of recent refugees resettled in the U.S. who reportedly lack urban industrial skills.

Skeptics, however, will and should object to the conclusions drawn from these samples. There are at least two reasons why they Cubans sent to Miami may be selective of the more highly skilled and better educated. First, if Castro did empty jails and mental hospitals as the allegations run, these "undesirables" would have arrived later than the period covered by these samples. They also would be more likely to have been sent to the other military bases. In addition, federal officials decided early in the processing operations at Key West to send family groups to Miami and single men and women elsewhere. The larger share of families in the sample from Opa Locka, compared to those registered at the Emergency Center, is a consequence of this decision.

To check on these probably biases I acquired the INS biographical data forms for the Cubans processed at Eglin Air Force Base. This is just the first step of a project which will document the background characteristics of all 117,000 or so arriving since April 20, 1980. The project is carried out with the cooperation of the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Labor.[10] The data from Eglin Air Force Base are presented here for the first time.

The Eglin Profile

Interest in these records was the same: what are the Cubans' background characteristics? Do they differ from those in Miami? Do their occupational histories show that few are employable? And if there are a significant number with prison records, who are they and how long have they been encarcerated?

The sample was a 10% systematic random selection that identified for study 925 asylum applicants arriving throughout May. As was true of the registration data from Opa Locke, INS officials interviewed only persons 14 years of age or older. Information included age, sex, marital status, last place of residence in Cuba, and occupational histories.

The Eglin sample further documents the familiar observation that these Cubans are young, working age adults. Sixty-four percent at Eglin were between 20 and 34 years of age, compared to 58% of all those in Miami. The Eglin group averaged 33 years of age.

Much attention has focused on the predominance of single males in this flow: expectations are that single males are more difficult than family groups to resettle. In fact and as anticipated by the manner of processing at Key West, there were many single males at Eglin. Males outnumbered females nearly 9 to 1, representing 89.3% of the total camp population. One third of both males and females reported they were currently married, with the women more likely to be so than the men: 43.4% and 33.2%. Both the men and women at Eglin were significantly less likely to be married than their compatriots in Miami - where 56% of those at Opa Locke were married.

Since most of the new arrivals were in their late twenties and early thirties, they not only have many years ahead in the U.S. labor force, but have had a chance to accumulate substantial employment experience in Cuba. The nature of this experience is critical to judging them "socially undesirable". How, then, do those sent to Eglin fare?

Whereas unemployment was virtually negligible in both Miami samples, 2.8% of the Eglin group reported no employment as their longest held activity in Cuba ("principal job"). This unemployment rate increased to 4.7% immediately prior to departure. On the other hand, since most were single males, only 15% were out of the labor market in Cuba; that is, a homemaker, student, patient, or soldier. This compares to one third of the sample at Opa Locka. Clearly these Cubans at Eglin are used to work and are undoubtedly prepared for it in the U.S.

But what are their occupational experiences? Like those in Miami, they concentrate in four occupational categories: laborer (25.0%), craft (22.7%), machine operative (14.1%), and transport operative (11.2%). The Eglin group also contains nearly the same share of professional and technical workers and those in service jobs (see Table 1). Overall, the three samples provide a consistent occupational profile.

Table 1 about here

In more detail, the Cubans at Eglin had held what would be considered skilled or semi-skilled jobs. As craft workers and laborers, they worked primarily in manufacturing and construction. All three samples show a large number of mechanics, painters, masons, carpenters, heavy equipment operators, electricians, and bakers. Machine operatives at Eglin included lathers, sanders, welders, meat-cutters, and press operators. Of course transportation workers were mainly drivers of trucks, taxis, and buses.

Professional and technical workers at Eglin also matched those in Miami. Teachers at all grade levels were the largest number of such workers. This possibly evidences the reported significant cutbacks in educational enrollment in Cuba, especially at the university level. There were also a few doctors, nurses, and medical technicians, as well as a number of entertainers and athletes.

These people can hardly be said to have been marginal to the Cuban economy, nor unemployable in the U.S. Yet the charge of "undesirable" does not rest solely on occupational background. The most alarming stories concerned the prevalence of criminals.

"Just about every adult male I have talked to admitted to having been in prison in Cuba," charged Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.).[11] But the contrast with local officials is there again. "We don't know how many social deviates are coming in," said Ray Morris, INS district director. But, he continued, approximately 90% are "pretty much like the rest of society in America...."[12]

The key question, of course, is what does a prison record in Cuba mean. In what manner are they "socially undesirable"? For instance, the United States has accepted political prisoners from Cuba as part of normal immigration for several years. Those admitted in the first few months of fiscal year 1980 averaged 10.4 years in prison. Still it is a reasonable and unanswered question whether those with prison records in this most recent, massive flow committed similar "political" crimes.

The INS biographical data forms offer a rare glimpse of how many reported prison records, as well as the duration of their confinement. Unfortunately, only on occasion is it possible to determine why the person was in jail. Thus caution is necessary: the following information refers to all persons who reported a former offense regardless of the reason.

INS interviewers recorded that 16.4%, or 152 of the sampled emigrants at Eglin, had spent some time in jail.[13] Less than half, however, were in prison at the time of departure: 44.1% of the ex-offenders, or only 7.2% of the total camp population. Evidently most of these latest refugees left Cuba from their homes, not through prison gates.

The majority (55.2%) of the ex-offenders spent less than 3 years in jail: 6.2% for less than 60 days, 7.9% for less than a year, 24.7% between 1 and 2 years, and 16.4% from 2 to 3 years. Reasons given for these jail terms included robbery (1 to 2 years), drugs (2 to 3 years), vagrancy, refusing military service or to work for the State, and caught trying to escape to the U.S.

Six percent of all those with prison records specifically stated they were political prisoners. This is undoubtedly an underestimate. Another 3% could be included for refusing service to the State, either military or labor. And a small but significant proportion had been in prison for a considerable time dating from the early 1960s when many political prisoners were first jailed. But the most important reason for the undercount is simply that the majority did not report the nature of their crime. Consequently, I would argue that between 9% and 20% of those at Eglin who reported a prior offense could be classified as political prisoners.

Do these ex-offenders comprise an identifiable minority? Evidently not. The average age of the ex-offenders was 32.6 years, virtually the same as the total Eglin population. Both groups also had a similar proportion married and only slightly more of the ex-offenders were male. The only significant difference was in their occupational backgrounds (see Table 2).

Table 2 about here

Overall, ex-offenders were about as likely as the total Eglin group to be employed in each occupational category. But there are two exceptions. Just prior to departure ex-offenders had experienced an overall shift out of operative jobs and into non-farm laborer ones. There was also a less significant shift out of the professional and service sector and into construction. There could be many reasons for such a shift, but undoubtedly by U.S. standards, this represents a downward slide in skill requirements, status, and wages.

Along with this shift, the ex-offenders encountered a doubling of their unemployment rate - which was already twice that of the total Eglin group. Evidently the ex-offenders shared with all the Eglin-bound refugees a significant increase in economic hardship prior to leaving. But ex-offenders suffered doubly, perhaps because of their prior offense.

In the U.S.

How are we to evaluate this background profile? Evidently their experiences in Cuba do not justify the alarming charges of social undesirability, especially in terms of their occupational histories. Rather than on the margins of the labor market, the "Flotilla" migrants have served the mainstream of the urban Cuban economy. But what of their future in the United States? What jobs are they likely to find?

Their future can not be separated from the history of the entire post-Revolution exodus. The Cubans who came before should serve not only as an example of what may come, but given the resettlement program's special emphasis on family reunification and sponsorship, as co-participants in adapting to American life. For many the presence and vitality of the Cuban-American community will cushion the adjustments usually required of those involved in such migrations. In this "ethnic enclave" many will find jobs, often without the need to learn English. And socially many things will remain the same; for in Miami, you "can be born, or die and be buried, Cuban style."[14]

Like most refugee migrations, the Cuban exodus has developed through a series of outflows, with each group projecting distinct background profiles and encountering diverse experiences in the U.S. The importance of this sequential migration is that each wave sets the stage for the next. The earliest Cuban refugees, the "Golden Exiles", were the landowners, bankers, government officials, and businessmen who benefitted greatly from connections to the U.S. and who, as a result, had much to lose from the Revolution. Besides their wealth and status they also had attained a level of education far exceeding the remainder of the source Cuban population. A 1962 sample showed that 36% of this first wave had 12 years of formal schooling or more. At the time, this contrasted with only 4% of the entire Cuban population with such advanced education.[15]

The Cuban Missile Crisis stopped the outflow in 1962, only to have it restart 3 years later when the two governments agreed to a series of flights - the "aerial bridge" - that would bring any person who desired to leave to the U.S. (except those of military age and in strategic economic positions). Approximately 40% of the total exodus, excluding the most recent group, arrived on these flights from 1965 to 1973.

These "aerial bridge" refugees also represented the upper socio-economic strata of pre-revolutionary Cuba. As one journalist saw it then:

> "To a great extent these people represent the professional and business class of Cuba; the able, the educated, the successful. The struggle in most Latin American countries is to build a stable middle class; that of Cuba has been gutted. This exodus is the biggest brain drain the Western Hemisphere has known."[16]

A survey in 1968 added support. The aerial bridge arrivals had a level of formal schooling that still outstripped the source population. Rogg found that virtually the same percentage (37%) in 1968 had 12 or more years of education as in the earlier wave.[17]

The earliest exiles were able, in effect, to transplant their pre-revolutionary Cuban social position into fertile U.S. economic soil. Many in the first wave brought money with them or, more likely, had transfered substantial funds to the U.S. before their departure. In the U.S. both Federal and private business loans were readily available, as was substantial Federal funds for education and assistance. Some U.S. employers also re-hired their former employees.

Nevertheless, many experienced downward social mobility as they took whatever jobs were available - a characteristic common to refugees and immigrants. Professionals also experienced initial licensing problems, forcing many of them to accept jobs well below their level of training. Consequently, much of the apparent success of these early arrivals once in the U.S. was simply due to their substantial initial underemployment and the fact that their subsequent upward mobility was merely a return to their former statuses.[18]

The vitality of this Cuban-American enclave today is considerable, as a recent albeit self-congratulatory profile of the Miami enclave testifies.[19]

In Dade County there are 16 banks (out of 62) with Cuban presidents, 250 vice presidents, and more than 500 other bank officers. Approximately one-third (18,000) of the businesses in Miami are Cuban owned or operated. On the labor side, 85% of the garment industry's factory workforce is Cuban-American. Cubans staff most of the hotels and their share of construction workers has reportedly reached nearly 75%.

But neither should the enclave's success be overstated. The same article notes that the average income of the Cuban head of household in Miami is only $15,000 per year, with 31% earning less than $12,000. Nationwide, Cubans have an unemployment rate significantly higher than the total civilian labor force even though they are on average an older workforce that is typically less subject to joblessness.[20]

The Cuban flow has also significantly changed in background composition. Casal and Hernandez, for example, have noted a steady decline in the educational levels of each successive cohort of Cuban refugees. This change began in the later years of the aerial bridge and has continued since.[21]

The compositional change has had an impact on Cuban communities in the U.S. The later arrivals have, in a sense, become the working class - lower waged and skilled - for the golden exiles of the 1960s and early 1970s. It is in this manner that there has been a total transplanting of the pre-revolutionary Cuban social structure into Miami - with all the implications of unequal welath, power, and prestige. The recent "Flotilla" emigrants will add to the lower strata.

Of course how the new Cuban immigrants will progress in the U.S. is still a question. Some lessons, however, may be gained by studying a similar group who entered in 1973-74. This comparison, while not precise, demonstrates not only the changing composition of the Cuban migration, but identifies the ability of the ethnic enclave to incorporate subsequent newcomers.

The comparison group is 590 male Cubans who arrived after the close of the "freedom flights". Most left Cuba several years before and had spent time in Spain. Interviewed for the first time upon arrival, they were tracked and re-interviewed in 1976-77 and again in 1979. The series of interviews provide a profile of their experiences over six to seven years in the U.S.[22]

This sampled group shares with the 'Flotilla' arrivals a distinctly working class character. Only 22% had attained 12 years of formal schooling. This was significantly lower than the earlier refugees, but still higher than the Cuban population. Their average education, 8.6 years, was virtually the same as those sampled recently in Miami. And, reflecting their lower education, the 1973-74 sample shared with the recent arrivals a significant lack of English knowledge.

Their occupational histories correspond to the contemporary economic reforms intended to socialize the remaining, smaller scale sectors of the private urban economy. In fact, although political pressures continued to be a primary reason for leaving, they were just as likely to mention the inability of achieving over a longer period a higher standard of living. The evidence presented above that many of the Eglin-based Cubans suffered increased economic hardship prior to departure suggests that the motivations of the two groups may be similar too.

About a third (32.5%) of the 1973-74 group derived their income in Cuba from either government or educational institutions. Wholesale and retail sales accounted for another 21.2%, while direct personal services employed 15.1%. A rough approximation with U.S. occupational classifications shows that nearly 30% were craft workers or non-transport machine operatives; including supervisors, artisans, plumbers, electricians, carpenters, butchers, and bakers. Service workers represented 19.7%. A quarter held white-colloar or professional jobs: a category combining professional and technical workers with clerical workers.

These occupational origins correspond rather closely with the 'Flotilla' emigrants' histories, especially in their common concentration in craft and operative jobs. To the extent that these background experiences help in the U.S. labor market, the progress of the 1973-74 group may provide a clue as to the future of the latest arrivals. Both groups, by the way, arrived in the midst of a recession, although the current one is deeper.

In their first job in Miami, where almost all settled, 48% found employment as craft workers or machine operatives. This indicates a substantial, overall shift to these categories from other occupations held in Cuba. Another 38% were unskilled laborers and only 5% were professionals or managers. The majority located employment in manufacturing (34.3%) or construction (22.0%).

After three years in the U.S. most had regained positions comparable to the ones abandoned in Cuba. They earned on the average a modest $7,764 per year. But more importantly, 40% were employed by firms that were owned or operated by other Cubans. In fact, preliminary figures from the interviews after six years show that the enclave still employed 40% of these refugees.[23]

The 1973-74 refugees were able to utilize their working class skills in the U.S. labor market.[24] Higher levels of education and English knowledge were particularly associated with greater earnings. But even more important was the positive impact of enclave participation. Within this 1973-74 group, those who worked for Cuban owned or managed firms earned significantly more each month than those who did not work in such places.

Taking the liberty of projecting this future on the majority of the 'Flotilla' emigrants, it is likely that they will find self-sustaining employment within a relatively short period as part of the Cuban-American working class. The Cuban community in the U.S. will also play the important role of not only providing initial aid, as evidenced already by the outpouring of emergency relief in Miami, but by employing a substantial proportion.

This direct contribution of the Cuban enclave is much more important in the present context than before because the current posture of the Carter Administration is to ask more of the local communities than ever before. Herein probably lies the explanation for the contrast between the chaotic public images and local reality: for the circumstances surrounding the current influx have changed from earlier waves, and with them the rules of resettlement. But the task of reuniting with one's family and starting over remains the same.

Conclusion

There are several reasons why this resettlement of Cuban refugees may not succeed as well as previous programs. Most of the reasons have been well played in the press and pointed to in this paper. The size of the influx combined with its velocity makes shambles of orderly processing. Recurring problems with locating responsible sponsors are a consequence. Other characteristics of these refugees, or the profiles of those not represented in these samples, may also identify problems. The apparently small but significant proportion of homosexuals in this group is merely another example. And the likelihood of a prolonged recession, coupled with conservative fiscal policy to combat inflation, promise only bad times ahead.

But in addition, there are two particular rule changes in progress that will not only have an effect on these Cubans, but because of the timing of this influx, will be pushed along with greater speed - and perhaps less care.

The "Freedom Flotilla" came only weeks after Congress passed legislation finally regularizing the procedure for admitting refugees. The Cubans, and with them the Haitians, became the first test; a test of perhaps the weakest section of the Act, procedures for case by case review of asylum applicants. As if someone had studied the legislation to determine what it did not cover, recent events touched the one area not contemplated in detail beforehand - the United States as a country of first asylum. Indeed much of the delay in the Carter Administration's deliberations on the Cubans would be attributed to an attempt to conceptualize the U.S.

as a place of first asylum. But searches for other countries to accept large proportions of these Cubans and appeals to the United Nations lacked the urgency of other contemporary moves by countries of first asylum to gain international cooperation. Recall that in the case of the Vietnamese "boat people" the world responded only after Malaysia and Singapore began towing refugee-laden boats back out to sea.

Also like the Southeast Asian countries of first asylum the Carter Administration held that it could not afford to accept the entire flow - thus setting up a monumental dilemma. U.S. refugee policy is traveling in two opposing directions: a move to reach out to compelling international and humanitarian problems, while withdrawing from policies of domestic relief. The result is a series of false steps in both directions and much bewilderment. Even the eventual offer to provide Federal payment for some Cuban and Haitian-related services ended up as much less than it appeared. The plan to make them eligible for certain social programs is a case in point. "I think the numbers (of refugees who receive aid) are going to be much smaller...," said Linda Berkowitz, spokeswoman for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. "What they are talking about is an emergency assistance program which Florida does not have, and a medical assistance program which Florida does not have."[25]

The Cuban influx also occurred at a bad time, not only because we are caught in an anti-immigration period of public mood, with U.S. citizens pressed by unemployment, inflation, and foreign conflict, but because we are also engaged in an effort to reform the immigration law. The combination of the three gives to immigration an unwarranted importance in relation to other national problems. Immigrants become associated with all kinds of social and economic ills. The most common, though, is employment. "With more than 7 million Americans out of work," complained Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), "it is hardly surprising that the public does not welcome a chaotic new avalanche of Cuban refugees."[26] But, Mr. Church, will leaving 117,000 people at sea solve your unemployment problem?

FOOTNOTES

1. *The Washington Post*, May 4, 1980, p. A26.
2. *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1980, p. A1.
3. See Press Release, statement by Victor H. Palmeiri, United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, June 20, 1980.
4. *The Washington Post*, May 3, 1980, p. A10.
5. *The Washington Post*, May 4, 1980, p. A6.
6. *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1980, p. A22.
7. Part of the reason for this change of responsibility was that without a declared refugee status for the Cubans the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, which is funded by the Department of Health and Human Services, could not remain involved.
8. For more detail see Bach, Robert L., "A Profile of the Recent Cuban Refugees Arriving in Miami," *Migration Today*, 1980, forthcoming.
9. *Ibid*.
10. By the time this article is published the profile of all 117,000 or so will be available from either the author or the Coordinator's office.
11. *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1980, p. A37.
12. *Ibid*.
13. One should wonder, of course, whether the applicants told the truth. Although there is no way to check, my impression is that the incentive was there to be truthful. INS interviewers were instructed to ask for detail if the applicant could not account for blocks of time in his or her occupational history, plus the applicants knew that they would also be interviewed and cleared through the FBI and CIA.

14. Arboleya, Carlos J., "The Cuban Community 1980. Coming of Age, as History Repeats Itself." Reprint, page 5.

15. Portes, Alejandro, Juan M. Clark, and Robert L. Bach, "The New Wave: A Statistical Profile of Recent Cuban Exiles to the U.S.", Cuban Studies Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 1-32.

16. Quoted in Cue, Reynaldo A. and Robert L. Bach, "The Return of the Clandestine Worker and the End of the Golden Exile: Recent Mexican and Cuban Immigrants in the United States," paper presented at the Conference on "The New Immigration," Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution, Sept. 15-17, 1976, p.22.

17. Rogg, Eleanor M., The Assimilation of Cuban Exiles: The Role of Community and Class. New York: Aberdeen Press, 1974.

18. Truett, Dale, Chapter on Miami in University of Kentucky, Negro Employment in the South. Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor grant 81-19-68-13, 1973.

19. Arboleya, op cit.

20. The figures used for this statement are for 1977. See Morris J. Newman, "A Profile of Hispanics in the U.S. work force", Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 101, No. 12, December 1978, pp. 3-14. The 1977 figures are useful here because they provide sufficient time for the aerial bridge group to recover from any initial disorientation, but do not include those entering much after the "freedom flights" and under special arrangements to release political prisoners.

21. Casal, Lourdes, and Andres R. Hernandez, "Cubans in the U.S.: A Survey of the Literature," Cuban Studies, 5 (July 1975), pp. 25-51.

22. See Portes et al., 1977, for a detailed description of the research design.

23. Portes, Alejandro, and Juan M. Clark, "Cuban Immigration to the United States, 1972-79: A Preliminary Report of Findings," mimeo, Center for International Studies, Duke University, Durham, N.C., May 13, 1980.

24. Portes, Alejandro, and Robert L. Bach, "Immigrant Earnings: Determinants of Economic Attainment Among Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States," International Migration Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 1980.

25. The Tampa Tribune, June 23, 1980.

26. The Washington Post, June 5, 1980, p. A6.

Table 1: Cuban Refugees' Last Occupation in Cuba, persons 14 years old and over.

Occupation	Emergency Center		Opa Locke		Eglin	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Out of the labor force	141	18.0	21	32.8	139	15.3
Unemployed	1	0.2	0	0.0	36	4.7
Professional, technical	67	10.5	3	7.0	52	7.1
Manager, administrator	11	1.7	1	2.3	11	1.5
Sales	9	1.4	1	2.3	7	1.0
Clerical	45	7.0	4	9.3	45	6.1
Craft	197	30.7	6	14.0	166	22.7
Operative	73	11.4	4	9.3	103	14.1
Transport Operative	86	13.4	12	27.8	82	11.2
Laborer	108	16.9	3	7.0	183	25.0
Farm Laborer	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	1.1
Farmer	2	0.3	3	7.0	0	0.0
Service	43	6.7	6	14.0	74	10.1
Private household	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1
Total with a job	641[1]	100.0	43	100.0	732[2]	100.0

1. one occupation unspecified
2. 18 persons or 1.9% of the total missing.

Table 2: Cuban Refugee's Principal and Last Occupation in Cuba, persons 14 years old and over: Total and Ex-offenders.

Occupation	Total Eglin				Ex-offenders			
	Principal Job		Last Job		Principal Job		Last Job	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Out of Labor Market	152	16.7	139	15.3	61	40.1	72	47.7
Unemployed	21	2.8	36	4.7	5	5.5	9	11.4
Professional, technical	56	7.4	52	6.8	7	7.7	4	5.1
Manager, admin.	10	1.3	11	1.4	2	2.2	1	1.3
Sales	10	1.3	7	0.9	2	2.2	2	2.5
Clerical	44	5.8	45	5.9	5	5.5	3	3.8
Craft	170	22.5	166	21.6	18	19.8	16	20.2
Operative	115	15.2	103	13.4	13	14.3	4	5.1
Transport Operative	82	10.8	82	10.7	10	11.1	8	10.1
Laborer	168	22.2	183	23.8	22	24.2	29	36.7
Farm Laborer	8	1.1	8	1.0	1	1.1	0	0.0
Farmer	2	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Service	69	9.1	74	9.7	6	6.5	3	3.8
Private household	1	0.2	1	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total with a job	756[1]	100.0	768[2]	100.0	91	100.1[3]	79[4]	100.0

1. 17 missing or 1.8% of total.
2. 18 missing or 1.9% of total.
3. Does not add to 100 due to rounding.
4. 1 missing.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND REFUGEES: THE CARIBBEAN, SOUTH FLORIDA & THE NORTHEAST

A Report on Two Conferences
and
A Position Paper Presented
to the
U.S. Coordinator on Refugee Affairs
Washington, D.C.

By

Anthony P. Maingot
Professor and Chairman
Florida International University
Department of Sociology/Anthropology
Miami, Florida 33199

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PREFACE

Following a special request from Ambassador Victor Palmieri, U. S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs, Professors Antonio Jorge and Anthony P. Maingot co-chaired a conference in two parts entitled "International Migration and Refugees: The Caribbean and South Florida" on August 21 and 22, 1980. The first part was composed of the presentation of four scholarly papers, responses by assigned community leaders followed by questions from the audience.(1) This public session raised many of the key themes dealt with in a private session the next day. At that private meeting, scholars, community leaders and State Department personnel(2) addressed these issues and others based on a list of questions prepared in advanced by the Office of Refugee Affairs.(3) On November 20, 1980 another meeting was held in New York City hosted by Mayor Edward I. Koch and the Office of the Mayor (this time there were no scholarly presentations or public sessions). In New York, different groups addressed very similar issues eventhough given a different set of questions in advance.(4)

It was agreed in advance that both these meetings were not to be attempts at formulating policy but rather probes into scholarly and community thinking on both the broad outlines of the problem and its more immediate, local repercussions.

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(1) Cf. Appendix I
(2) Cf. Appendix II
(3) Cf. Appendix III
(4) Cf. Appendix IV

As a means of keeping the dialogue alive, Ambassador Victor Palmieri suggested that I prepare a critical summary of both meetings and accompany that summary with a position paper of my own as regards South Florida. This I agreed to do and The Ford Foundation kindly consented to funding the exercise.

While the discussions and debates which took place during the two separate meetings logically ranged widely and diversely, the intent in Part I is to summarize, focus on these debates and to elaborate where necessary. In this first part there is no attempt to insert my own views on the subject; this is reserved for Part II.

What follows then is an attempt to raise new questions about an issue so complex that few are sanguine about reaching any definitive answers much less total agreement on solutions to the problem. One need not despair at this lack of certainty; in fact, it might be advantageous to recognize these limitations while also recognizing that this exercise in public and private debate is in itself salutory to the body politic. An informed public is better placed to make effective and just decisions.

PART I: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND REFUGEES

A. Four Scholars Look at the Caribbean

The present population of Jamaicans in the U.S. is equivalent to fully 22% of the population of that island; Puerto Ricans in the U.S. represent some 24% of that island's population, and 7% of the Haitians in the world live in the U.S.(1) These figures are testimony to two fundamental facts: (1) the Caribbean has always been an area of migration and, (2) the U.S.A. has traditionally been one of their favorite destinations. According to Richard Sinkin this will not change because the rate of natural increase and the present youthfulness of their population structures guarantee that the pool of potential migrants can only grow. Sinkin believes that this pool will provide actual migrants for a fundamental reason: the economic development of the whole Caribbean is characterized by "growth without development."

This type of skewed development invariably has two highly negative social structural consequences: unequal income distribution and high rates of unemployment and underemployment. Sinkin calculates that the Caribbean (outside of Cuba) will need one million new jobs in the next five years, a goal which at present seems quite impossible to reach. Not even Mexico with its new oil wealth will generate enough jobs to meet Mexican demands. Paradoxically, the U.S. presence further aggravates the problem as more investments encourage capital intensive industrialization, or I.M.F.-imposed austerity programs require cuts in the tertiary sector, a traditional employment-generating sector. The nature of development in areas such as the Caribbean, Sinkin concluded, virtually guarantees the continued migration of those seeking jobs.

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(1) Richard Sinkin, "International Migration and International Development". (No paper was received; this is based on my notes from his talk.)

Robert Bach picked up where Sinkin left off by focusing on the Cuban case, before and after the Mariel exodus of April, 1980.(1) Bach was optimistic about the speedy assimilation of the Mariel refugees since the initial statistical "profile" showed that they compared favorably on a number of attributes with the pre-Mariel ones. They tended to be young males who as a group showed two interesting patterns before migrating from Cuba: (1) a decline in social status, and (2) an increase in unemployment. Bach noted that eventhough they cited political pressures as the primary reason for leaving, economic hardships and an inability to advance in social status were just as often cited.

Although not developed as a distinct theme, Bach's depiction of Cuba is that of an island little different from the rest of the Caribbean: An economic development program unable to cope with a growing and increasingly youthful population.(2)

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(1) "Pre-Mariel Cuban Refugees and the Mariel Group: A Comparative View".

(2) At a recent meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association (Curacao, March 1980), I hypothesized that at least at this level Cuba was finally becoming "another Caribbean country". Never before, not even during times of severe political crises, have Cubans migrated in such numbers.

According to Bach, the big difference between the two groups under analysis and their impacts on the community would probably not stem from differences between their social compositions but rather from shifting U.S. Government policies. First there was the shift away from the original definition of refugee as one escaping Communist persecution. The new definition adjusts to the U.N. definition. Related to this is what Bach called the Carter Administration's "back seat" approach: shifting the burden of refugee assistance to local bodies, state, municipal and private. These two changes, but fundamentally the second, would create a quite different climate and milieu for the refugees and eventually for the local communities they settled in. Bach was optimistic about the ability of the local Cuban community to absorb the Mariel refugees. In hindsight, the situation proved to be quite a bit more complex than he had predicted.

Compared to the Cuban who has historically migrated only during periods of great political strife and now more and more because of a failing economy, the English-speaking West Indian has always viewed the whole world as their potential labor market. Dawn Marshall regards this historically and culturally engrained acceptance of migration as a constant in the West Indian past.(1) Whether it be the Panama Canal, railroads in

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(1) "The West Indian Migrant: Historical Notes and Contemporary Trends." A useful survey of the Haitian situation in the Bahamas is contained in Dawn Marshall, The Haitian Problem; (Mona, Jamaica, ISER, 1979).

Costa Rica or banana plantations in Honduras, West Indians were ready and eager to migrate. With this willingness to move went an equally strong desire to eventually return to Jamaica, Barbados or whichever island he originated from. Shifts in direction of migration have been dramatic. The substantial movement to the Northeast of the U.S. for instance was reduced to a trickle by the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952. This came at a time when more and more West Indians were turning to London and other industrial centers of Britain to fill their labor needs.

Since the early 1970's the trend has been towards the U.S.A. again and also towards Canada. Again, the explanation lay outside the West Indies; it was a result of the restriction on immigration imposed by Britain on the now fully independent ex-colonies.

Marshall noted two important recent changes in the composition of this historical migratory trend: the increase in the number of women migrating and, secondly, the view of the independent West Indian nations that migration represents a loss of native talent, of vital human resources.(1) This last fact, notwithstanding, the popular West Indian attitude towards migration remains unchanged: it is still perceived as a realistic option as well as a welcome opportunity.(2)

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(1) This guarded attitude on the part of West Indian governments reflects the fact that it tends to be those with skills who migrate, not the lumpen proletariat.

(2) It must not be assumed, however, that West Indians are willing to go just anywhere were employment is offered. In the late 1950's the movement to London was so great that some islands were being "denuded" (a term used by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Economic Development in the Independent West Indies Federation, 1960; p. 12); jobs on those islands went begging.

Such a popular view exists also in Haiti where, according to James Allman(1) between 12% and 15% of the population has migrated between 1950 and 1980. Because most of this migration takes place "illegally", i.e. outside any governmental or state control or regulation at either end of the move, it is difficult to analyze. It is known that to the extent the Haitian government has had any kind of explicit (not to say official) position on migration, it has recently relaxed the process somewhat. Passports and visas(2) are cheaper now than they used to be.

Allman outlined the traditional migration of educated Haitians to France and French Africa and compared it to the more massive movement of working class Haitians to the U.S.A., Canada and the Dominican Republic. Cuba used to be a desirable destination in the 1910-1930 period but this diminished after the 1933-34 anti-foreigner movement there and completely dried up after 1959 revolution. Allman concluded that while New York continues to be the most desirable ultimate stop of the Haitians, Miami is now the preferred point of entry.(3)

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(1) "Haitian International Migration: Estimates for 1950-1980".

(2) Haitian nationals requires a "visa" to reenter their country.

(3) In a way there is an interesting comparison to be made between the movement of British West Indians under colonialism and that of Haitians. After France granted independence to many African colonies there seemed to have been a decrease of Haitian migration there. An intriguing hypothesis is that the right of movement was better assured under colonialism than under independence.

B. SOUTH FLORIDA COMMUNITY LEADERS RESPOND

The responses from the three community leaders assigned to the task were in a way predictable and reflected the crystallization of views and positions on the "refugee" issue in the community. The Reverend Irving Elligan, prestigious black leader and President of the Community Relations Board criticized the four speakers for not addressing the question of racial discrimination in U.S. immigration policy. He anticipated the discussion of impacts on the community (to be discussed the next day) by addressing the question of "who pays for the costs" incurred by a community while caring for new immigrants and/or refugees. He was forceful also on the issue of new groups imposing their language on the native group, an obvious reference to the "bilingual" debate which was raging in the community at the time.(1) It would not be an exageration to say that Rev. Elligan reflected the views of Miami's black community well.

Monsignor Bryan Walsh, Director of Catholic Charities in Miami and an extremely influential community leader, noted that none of the speakers had made reference to international law and to the various treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. He addressed the obvious difference in treatment given to the new Cuban and Haitian "boat people" and that given Soviet Jews and Vietnamese;

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(1) The issue was "settled" in November 1980 through a referendum which abrogated Dade County's Ordinance making the county officially bilingual.

the latter received the full compliment of welfare services, the former only food stamps. Mgrs. Walsh was advancing the preferred argument of those advocating refugee status for the Haitians: the comparative argument with the implication that racism lay behind the differential treatment.

Marshall Harris, a former State Legislator, past President of United Way of Dade County and present banker and attorney, expressed what appears to be the view of the majority of Dade Countians when he confessed no surprise at hearing that Miami would probably be beseiged by refugees in the future. Visa abuse, he noted was no longer even regarded as a crime. In the face of this predictable and apparently uncontrollable denouement, Marshall's only wish was that he had "a government which had a policy."

The papers and the audience responses had set the tone for the private discussion convened for the next day. They reflected well the trauma which the community was experiencing at the time(1) and which were discussed in depth at the private session the next day (August 22, 1980).

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(1) For fuller development of these points see my "Position Paper" enclosed.

The first part of the day was dedicated to an analysis of the political, social and economic conditions of the "sending" countries in the Caribbean. The invited group(1) followed the questions submitted beforehand quite closely.(2)

Professor Richard Sinkin presented the view that political conditions in the Caribbean were very unstable and the prospects were that many years of drift to the political left were in store. Refugees from this unrest would be of all social classes but a large proportion would be dispossessed middle and upper classes. Professor A. P. Maingot disputed this view of political instability pointing rather to a noticeable swing to the right in many of the islands.(3) The economic and demographic conditions, however, would in themselves insure continued migration. In fact, slightly improved conditions might encourage more migration if the opportunities at the other end were open as they tend to be throughout the Caribbean. Professor Dawn Marshall concurred, there was no economic solution in sight to migration from the Caribbean. There was general agreement with Sinkin, however, that the cases of Mexico and the Dominican Republic were somewhat similar in this respect. The government in both countries actively regarded migration as an escape valve. U.S. relations with both countries but especially with Mexico, were colored and made more delicate by this element of population movements.(1) The case in Central America was seen as being quite different; political instability in Nicaragua and El Salvador had already led to substantial migrations of various groups to Miami especially.

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(1) Cf. Appendix II
(2) Cf. Appendix III
(3) Cf. Appendix VII

John McMullen of The Miami Herald wondered to what extent the freedom of entry into the U.S. was a hindrance to the U.S. Government taking decisive action to assist the Caribbean countries. The question was never directly answered. Richard Sinkin and others noted, however, than there were benefits which accrued to the Caribbean from this migration, an indirect U.S. participation, thus. A few of these benefits were:

(a) Returnees take back significant new experiences and skills.

(b) The remissions from these immigrants is an important monetary contribution to the economies of many of these countries (in Mexico they are more significant than the gains from tourism.)

(c) The presence in the U.S. of substantial communities originally from the Caribbean creates bonds and attachments which have considerable value in the political and international arenas.

Finally, as Victor Palmieri noted, this migration does force the U.S. to continually renew and replenish its own sense of values and democratic beliefs. In the final analysis, however, these benefits were generally held to be marginal and secondary, hardly compensation for the problems existing at both ends of the movement. The prospect of a Caribbean and Central America continually shipping people to the U.S. was regarded as a problem of major proportions. This danger was highlighted by Representative Joseph Gersten who spoke as an elected official from this area. The problem was such, he noted that it called for immediate and drastic action, no matter how painful these actions turned out to be.

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(1) A good essay on this fact is Sidney Weintraub and Stanley R. Ross's The Illegal Alien from Mexico: Policy Choices for an Intractable Issue (Austin: Texas, 1980).

The points of view expressed in this part of the discussion were strong and urgent reflections of the situation as perceived by South Floridians a few months after the Mariel boatlift had deposited thousands of new people in the area. Perhaps it might be helpful to link this discussion with the one in New York on November 20, 1980 since they both dealt with U.S. policies and attitudes. The positions of the various participants in both meetings(1) in a way reflect those found in the larger communities and can best be expressed in summarized form by the following fourfold table:

	Favor Closed Door	Favor Open Door
Persons with Fixed Positions	A	B
Those Open to Persuasion	C	D

The "A" and "B" positions have been crystallizing very fast in the 1970's and it appears that "A" is growing with more and more conversions from "C" and "D". This crystallization of views on the overall issue often means an unwillingness to make concessions on any part of the problem. Witness, for instance, the similarity in responses of the Rev. Bryan Walsh in Miami, Horace Morris, and Rev. Antoine Adrien in New York to a series of issues (Table No. 1).

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(1) For the participants in the New York Meeting see Appendix IV.

Table No. 1: The Crystallization of Views

	Issue	Person Raising Issue	Walsh, Morris and Adrien Responses
1.	Immigration today Involves much smuggling, a "growth industry".	V. Palmieri	This has always been the mechanism in American history; the middleman is made necessary because the movement is illegal.
2.	Immigrants contribute to population growth which is detrimental.	John McMullen	The damage resulting from the movement of native populations out of New York and Miami, plus low U.S. birth rates have been mitigated by immigration.
3.	The impact on the community has been negative, increased social tensions.	Rev. Elligan Rep. J. Gersten	Social Services hardly used; lowly jobs taken by refugees; ethnic communities contribute to stronger societies.
4.	Reasons for illegal rush of Cubans (viz. Mariel): A climate of illegality and an inability to control borders.	Phil Chicola Sandy Gammie	The fault lies with the slowness of actions of U.S. Government and Interest Section in Habana to process prisoners, relatives, etc...

Positions among group "A" and "B", thus, tend to be across the board; only occasionally will a concession be made to a certain pragmatism. Msgr. Walsh, faced with the overwhelming statistics presented by the members of the Task Force and the academics, agreed that there might be a need to undertake some differentiation in the processing; he agreed that the new category "Cuban-Haitian Entrant" was an acceptable compromise given the political and financial realities existant. He stressed, however, that preference should always be given to those who physically arrive at U.S. borders, as distinct from those who are in refugee camps elsewhere (viz. Cuban and Haitian boat people over Vietnamese in Thailand camps). Part of the problem at arriving at a concensus is that virtually any position on a matter as complex as this will find enough scholarly opinion and data to sustain itself.(1) But there are other complexities. A comparison of the discussions in Miami and New York reveal another aspect of the intractability of the issue. The sizable Haitian community in New York and New Jersey apparently have a capacity to absorb relatively painlessly large numbers of new Haitians, other cities do not. To New York Haitian leaders such as Rev. Adrien the numbers arriving in Miami do not warrant such degrees of alarm (the word "hysteria" was used more than once.) New Jersey Cuban spokemen such as the Rev. Raul

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(1) A good idea of the vastness of the scholarship is contained in Edwin R. Schander, "Immigration Law and Practice in the United States: A Selective Bibliography." International Migration Review (Spring 1978), pp. 117-127.

Comersañas showed little alarm when they talked of "possibly one million" Cubans wanting to come.(1) In the New York-New Jersey area these figures are contrasted to the 450,000 or so Dominicans who are settled and to which, as Mayor Koch told the New York conference, New Yorkers respond with their traditional nonchalance.(2) "So what else is new?" seems to be the attitude. In Miami, however, even the 90,000 Cubans from Mariel and 20,000 Haitian boat people have sent the community into a spiral of escalating conflict and tension.

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(1) It is an interesting fact that community leaders such as the Rev. Comersañas and the Rev. Adrien usually plead only for their particular groups. There is never a comparison made, each case is "Unique" and "special".

(2) Not all New Yorkers appear to be so sanguine. Carol Bellamy, President, City Hall of New York Council put this concern vividly:

> "We've not begun to see the true impact on /sic/ the immigration deluge which is coming. Both in sheer numbers and in terms of social dislocation, the new wave of immigrants will put this country's economy and ideology to the test as never before." (November 25, 1980)

The differential impacts of national policy has yet to be studied, research still tends to be regional and addressed to specific problems. "Border" problems tend to be limited to Mexican-American issues and are studied by research centers located in Texas and California. The problems of the Northeast are studied in New York. Cuban and Haitian problems are seen as "South Florida's" burden. If they do nothing else conferences such as the ones in Miami and New York help raise general questions of concern to community leaders, academics and national policy makers alike; they universalize the issue.

When, for instance, Msgr. John B. Ahearn in New York notes that illegal immigration in the final analysis affects attitudes towards law in general, he raises the eternal question of the delicate balance between social order, social control and freedom, a question which should not be left out of the discussion.(1) The following general issues were raised and are worth repeating here:

Dawn Marshall (Miami): The impact on third countries has to be considered. Haitians on their way to the U.S. use the Bahamas more and more as a "funnel"; this (when combined with the flow of drugs through the Bahamas) leaves the Bahamian with a sense that they have lost control of their nation.

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(1) I attempt to point out in my own Position Paper that the real task is to probe more fully some of these more general questions raised by the specific problem.

Michael Teitelbaum (Miami): There is no U.S. capacity to completely control "unauthorized entries" into the U.S. but the existing capacity has to be upgraded. This upgrading of enforcement should be accompanied by the elimination of certain obvious "pull" factors such as the Texas Proviso."(1)

Charles Sternberg (New York) presented an idea which in New York became known as the "Sternberg model": if you admit that your values are to accept the dispossessed and if you also admit that you cannot control your borders, act as if you are in control of the situation and accept those who arrive on your coasts. This stance was also discussed by Professor Barry B. Levine in Miami.

This last position is an intriguing one if only because one is forced to consider what the consequences and rammifications might be if one simply ignored the problem. I would suggest that the questions of number of migrants (refugees, legal and illegal immigrants), and specific social and economic impacts on the country are significant but not the most significant questions. The most significant question is the one raised by Msgr. Ahearn: How would it affect the general attitude toward law. Could one, for instance, in the face of universal tax evasion decide to ignore the matter? What are the limits of such an approach? How would it affect the nation's sovereignty? Could one apprehend and fine a trawler fishing in territorial waters but not a smuggler's boat bringing in "refugees"? The fact is that as difficult as enforcing the law might be, it is simple compared to the problems which ignoring the law invariably bring in their wake. The nation needs a just law on immigration and hopefully the Select Commission will produce something which comes close. Upon doing that the nation has to enforce it.

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(1) Further on this in Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Right Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy"; Foreign Affairs (Fall 1980), 21-59.